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ABSTRACT
In 1982, the Supreme Court held in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe that tribes have the sovereign power to tax non-member oil
and gas lessees on reservations.Merrion sanctioned an expansive
view of tribal sovereignty at a time when many western tribes
were adapting to a new federal policy of self determination by
trying to take charge of natural resource production on the
reservations.Merrion suggested that the Court would respect the
efforts of tribes to govern as distinct political entities.
Twenty years after Merrion, Robert Nordhaus and two coauthors reconstruct the seminal case he brought to the Supreme
Court as the Jicarilla Apache Tribe's attorney. The following
account is based on transcripts of interviews with Nordhaus
taped in 1997 as part of the University of New Mexico School of
Law's New Mexico Oral History Project. The interviews were
supplemented by legal research in the archives of the New Mexico
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Federal District Court, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, and
the United States Supreme Court. In addition, the authors drew
on the personal papers of Robert Nordhaus, as well as the papers
of Supreme Court Justices William J.Brennan and Thurgood
Marshall. Interviews of various participants-judges, lawyers,
and law clerks--completed the research. The resulting annals of
litigation provide an intimate portrait of a critical lawsuit
involving a critical issue-sovereign Indian control of natural
resources on reservations-asimportant and fragile in the course
of the litigationthen as it is today
I: INTRODUCING MERRION v. JICARILLA APACHE TRIBE
At just after eleven on Friday morning, June 3, 1977, the
Honorable H. Vearle Payne presided over an impromptu attorney
conference in his chambers in the U.S. District Court in Albuquerque.
"What is the name of this?" he asked his clerk.
"Merrion versus Jicarilla." 1
Ten days earlier, attorneys representing 19 oil and gas
companies had filed suit against the Jicarilla Apache Tribe for imposing
a severance tax on oil and gas taken from the reservation.2 While the
Tribe had been collecting royalties off mineral leases to the companies
since the 1950s, in 1976 the Tribe decided to initiate a severance tax in
addition to the royalties. Prior to the 1970s, no tribe had ever imposed a
severance tax on natural resources taken from the reservation. Before the
idea could catch on with other mineral-rich tribes, the energy producers
with tribal leases wanted it declared illegal. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe would mark the first time a tribal severance tax was challenged in
the courts.3
With the hearing on the preliminary injunction challenging the
tax set just a week before the first payment was due on June 15, both
sides scrambled to get ready. In response to the suit, Robert Nordhaus,
general counsel for the tribe, slapped all 19 plaintiffs with subpoenas for
1. Transcript of Attorney Conference at 24, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No.
77292-P (D.N.M. Dec. 29, 1977).
2. Eventually 21 oil and gas producers would join the fight opposing the severance
tax. The companies, a mix of major corporations and smaller, independent producers,
included: Merrion and Bayless, Jerome T. McHugh, Chase Oil Co., Dugan Production
Corp., Consolidated Oil and Gas, Inc., Southland Royalty Co., Tesoro Petroleum
Corp.,
Amerada Hess, Supron Energy Corp., Energy Reserves Group, Inc., J.M. Huber Corp.,
Continental Oil Co., Atlantic Richfield Co., Phillips Petroleum Co., Tenneco Oil Co.,
Getty
Oil Co., Gulf Oil Co., Amoco Production Co., Marathon Oil Co., Mobil Oil Corp., and
Oxy
Petroleum.
3. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980), affid, 455 U.S.
130
(1982).
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documents. The evening before the attorney conference, telex copies of
the service were still churning into corporate offices as far away as Tulsa
and Houston. Irate that this was happening just four days before the
hearing, the companies' attorneys wanted to hash it out in front of the
judge.
"[W]e are talking about tens of thousands of pages of records, in
less than four days, two of which are a weekend, and all of which are
located a good distance from the court," complained Bruce Black, an
4
attorney for the plaintiffs.
"And the reason they are in a bind," Nordhaus countered, "and
not having time is because they waited until the last minute to set this
up, approximately 15 days before the tax was due. So I don't think they
5
have anything to complain about, as far as time is concerned."
The attorneys representing the oil companies balked at the
discovery request, characterizing it as too broad. This was not the first
legal battle between the Jicarilla Apache Tribe and the oil companies,
and those opposing the Tribe saw the request as a fishing expedition,
with the Tribe trying to get information through the back door that
6
would help in other litigation. Nordhaus explained that the Tribe
wanted tax estimates for each lease, information that the Tribe's
accountants were able to come up with on their own despite the short
time they had to prepare. "I am sure these companies," Nordhaus said,
"with their billions of dollars in resources, can get this information if
7
they want to."
Judge Payne, however, seemed overwhelmed by the arguments
and the case he was about to face. "This is all rather new to me," he said,
"and I haven't had time, nor will I have time to read all of the briefs and
8
all of the things that need to be done."
When Payne announced he wanted to delay taking any action
until he had time to digest everything, attorneys for both sides resisted.
The Tribe wanted to start enforcing its tax, but the oil and gas companies
refused to comply unless the tax was declared valid. Meanwhile, the
companies faced a one percent per month penalty if they chose not to
pay.
Nordhaus suggested postponing the injunction hearing until
June 15, but Black pointed out that was the day the tax was due.

4. Transcript of Attorney Conference at 8, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 77292-P (D.N.M. Dec. 29,1977).
5. Id. at9.
6. Id. at7.
7. Id. at 9.
8. Id. at 11.
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"No, I am not going to do that," Payne told Nordhaus. "You go
back and tell your people I am not going to do it. They don't do things
that fast, and I am not going to do them that fast."9
Payne, who did not go to law school but came to the federal
bench after reading the law, complained that he was being pressured
into "hauling off" and making a decision. "When I started being a
judge," he told the attorneys, "I talked to Chief [Judge] Murrah, and I
said, 'Judge, if I could have a little time I think I could decide these cases
about right.' And he said, 'Well.. .you just go ahead and decide them,
and we will correct the mistakes.' So I could decide it, but you might
have to go up there and let them correct the mistakes; that's the thing. So
I don't know, after they corrected it, maybe you wouldn't be any better
off than you would be if I just take a little more time."10
Payne's comments would prove to be ironic, as his decision in
the Merrion case did end up going to the Tenth Circuit, where it was
overturned. It would be five years before Judge Payne in 1982 would
issue the final order in the Merrion case, just a year before he died.
Nordhaus struggled to accommodate the judge's need for more
time and yet still press for the Tribe's interests. With obvious reluctance,
Nordhaus said he could ask the tribal council to put off penalties for a
couple of days until the court decided the injunction." Yet Payne refused
to budge. "Even if they are Indians," he said, "they ought to know that I
12
have to have a fair chance."
The judge was hostile from the beginning, Nordhaus recalls 25
years later. "He ate up what the plaintiffs' lawyers were telling him
about the unconstitutionality of the tax and how it would bankrupt the
13
small producers to say nothing of Gulf and Amoco."
Though things did not go well for the Jicarilla Apache Tribe at
the district court, Nordhaus meticulously laid a record for an appeal.
Every time Payne denied a piece of evidence, Nordhaus tendered offers
of proof to show that the tax was needed to provide services on the
reservation and that it would have little impact on either companies or
consumers. In the end, the federal district court held that the tax was
invalid because the Tribe lacked the authority to tax. But that was just
9. Id. at 15.
10. Id. at 15-16. Alfred P. Murrah, the namesake of the Oklahoma City federal building
that was bombed in 1995, served as Chief Judge of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals from
1959-1970.
11. Transcript of Attorney Conference at 17, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 77292-P (D.N.M. Dec. 29,1977).
12. Id.
13. All quotes from Robert I. Nordhaus not attributed to a source are taken from interviews conducted as part of the University of New Mexico School of Law's New Mexico
Oral History Project.
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the beginning of the Merrion case, which Nordhaus appealed to the
Tenth Circuit and eventually won before the U.S. Supreme Court.
In a six-to-three decision, the Supreme Court ruled that Indian
tribes have the right to impose severance taxes on outsiders who drill or
mine on reservation lands unless Congress expressly forbids it. In the
majority opinion, Justice Thurgood Marshall said, "The power to tax is
an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty because it is 14a necessary
management."
instrument of self-government and territorial
The immediate impact of the decision was to give the Jicarilla
Apache Tribe the go-ahead to impose its tax of 29 cents a barrel for oil
and five cents per million British thermal units (BTU) for gas. This
boosted the Tribe's annual income by $2 million dollars, giving it the
resources it wanted to control energy production, provide government
services, and diversify the economy.
The Merrion decision also made a huge impact on other tribes as
5
they developed their natural resources." Today, almost every tribe with
mineral wealth in the western United States imposes a severance tax on
resources extracted from its land. The decision also paved the way for
taxes on many reservations that had no mineral resources or other means
of support. After Merrion, tribes began to tax power lines and oil and gas
pipelines crossing reservations. Beyond its role in natural resource
policy, the Merrion decision left a legacy for American Indians by
upholding inherent tribal sovereignty, which has been called "the most
16
basic principle of all Indian law."
"The JicarillaApache opinion was one of the strongest pro-Indian
decisions ever handed down," said Indian law scholar Charles
Wilkinson. "It was a beacon of tribal 17sovereignty, the tribes' ultimate
authority to control their reservations."
II. BOB NORDHAUS: AN INDIAN LAWYER BY ACCIDENT
Now 93, Robert Nordhaus laughs when he's told Merrion has
been cited more than 250 times in cases, and the list of secondary sources
14. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982).
15. To give some idea of what was at stake for energy developers, the U.S. Bureau of
Indian Affairs' Division of Energy and Natural Resources estimated that resources on
reservations included 44.2 billion short tons of coal and lignite deposits, including much of
the nation's supply of valuable low-sulfur coal. In the 1970s, tribes supplied almost half of
all uranium mined in the Unites States. In 1996, American Indians received almost $96
million in royalties from reservation oil and natural gas production. DAVID H. GETCHES,
CHARLES F. WILKINSON & ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 697-698 (4th ed. 1998).
16. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 231 (1982 ed.).
17. CHARLES WILKINSON, FIRE ON THE PLATEAU: CONFLICT AND ENDURANCE IN THE
AMERICAN SOUTHWEST 110 (1999).
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goes on for pages.18 "That kind of tells you how important it was, doesn't
it?" Not bad for an Albuquerque lawyer who says he fell into Indian law
by accident.
Born in 1909, Nordhaus grew up in Albuquerque, New Mexico,
the son of a well-to-do family with interests in mercantile trading and
sheep ranching. He went back east to college at Yale and stayed on for
law school. Though his good grades and position on the editorial board
of the Yale Law Journal could have guaranteed him a position with a big
East Coast firm, Nordhaus didn't want to get stuck in a "factory." As
would other top Yale students, most notably future Supreme Court
Justice Byron White, Nordhaus decided to head back West to start his
legal career. In 1935, he came home to New Mexico.
In the early years of his practice in Albuquerque, Nordhaus
often found himself appointed to indigent cases in federal court, which
much of the time involved defending bootleggers who were selling
liquor to Indians, a federal offense. New Mexico's only federal judge at
the time was Colin Neblett, who, as far as Nordhaus knows, never wrote
an opinion, never made any findings of fact, and was never reversed.
"Judge Neblett appointed me because he played cards with my
dad and thought he didn't need to pay me because my family had some
money," Nordhaus recalls.
Another lawyer who took on federal appointments was Elfego
Baca. Infamous in New Mexico as the former gun-slinging sheriff of
Socorro County and twice tried for murder, Baca at 75 was a down-onhis-luck lawyer who couldn't afford not to represent bootleggers.
Though Baca had become a lawyer after reading the law, and in fact had
never even gone to college, he taught Nordhaus a thing or two about
practicing.
In court one day, Nordhaus watched as Assistant U.S. Attorney
Gilberto Espinosa tried to convict one of Baca's clients by proving the
defendant had sold a bottle of whiskey to an Indian. After introducing
the bottle into evidence, the prosecution rested.
Elfego Baca jumped to his feet, seized the bottle and waved it
before the jury.
"Has anybody opened it? No!"
"Has anybody tasted it? No!"
"Has anybody smelled it? No!"
"Ladies and gentlemen of the jury," Baca concluded, "if I put a
sign on my back saying 'Jesus Christ,' does that make me the Savior?"
The jury started laughing. Even Judge Neblett had a hard time keeping a
straight face.
18.

WESTLAW search, as of March 1, 2003.
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"It seems strange to me today that I was introduced to the
complexities of Indian law in those bootlegger cases," Nordhaus says of
his early days in the courtroom. But Baca proved to be a good teacher for
the young lawyer. "From him I learned the importance of a sense of
humor and the necessity of the careful investigation and presentation of
even the simplest seeming fact. When 30 years later I stumbled into the
much more complex area of Indian sovereignty and natural resource
development, an area that would increasingly demand my full attention
as a lawyer, I often found my opponents as casual about facts as the
prosecutor in that case had been about his bottle. And like Elfego Baca, I
was able to use that carelessness to the benefit of my clients."
Both the sense of humor and allegiance to the facts are evident in
Nordhaus at 93. Though age has slowed the seemingly unstoppable
Nordhaus and he occasionally navigates the halls of his apartment
building hooked up to a portable oxygen tank, the anecdotes he rattles
off about his career are perfectly polished tales he seems to offer as gifts.
His stories range from courtroom yams to memories of serving as an
officer in Italy in the Tenth Mountain Division during World War II. An
avid skier, Nordhaus was instrumental in bringing the world's longest
aerial tram to Albuquerque's Sandia Peak in the 1960s.
Through his eyes, the world of New Mexico law seems close-knit
and congenial. 19 As Merrion wound itself through the courts, Nordhaus
would find himself constantly bumping up against a slew of old-time
lawyers and judges, many of whom were longtime friends. His circle
expanded even wider with his Yale connections. He called Supreme
Court Justice Byron White a friend and once hosted Supreme Court
Justice William 0. Douglas, his former law professor, on a disastrous
hike down Sandia Peak in mid-winter that ended with Douglas being
carted down the mountain on a horse by moonlight.
Even among his friends Nordhaus had a reputation for being a
feisty lawyer, formidable with the facts. "Among the lawyers in his own
firm, Bob Nordhaus was known as a Boston terrier-type attorney,"
recalls Jim Beckley, a former partner. "He attached himself to a legal
problem with fanatic tenacity and then simply worried that problem to
death until he reached a result that satisfied him. No one worked harder.
No one worked with more imagination. He was the absolute model of a

19. Twenty years before Merrion, Nordhaus had the opportunity to argue an anti-trust
case involving a grocery store before the U.S. Supreme Court in Safeway Stores v. Vance, 355
U.S. 389 (1958). He thought he'd better buy a three-piece suit, so he went down to Strombergs, the local department store. "Oh," said the owner, "I haven't sold a suit with a vest in
years, but you're the second person this month to buy one." "Really," Nordhaus said,
"who's the other?" It was John Tittmann, the lawyer arguing the other side.
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zealous advocate and we stood in awe of him for it. Nobody could keep
up with him even when he was 70."'
The tenacity of Robert Nordhaus shows as he works to
corroborate the details of all of his stories. While he talks and laughs, he
sits at a table in his apartment and pulls from piles of materials around
him all manner of documents from a lifetime at the law: legal pleadings,
transcripts of the testimony in various cases, clipped and yellowing
newspaper articles, and even his pilot's logs. "Here," he says, pulling out
a crumpled document from years ago, "here's exactly the document I
was looking for."
Nordhaus's entry into Indian law came after a friend from Yale,
Richard Davis of the Denver law firm Davis, Graham and Stubbs, asked
for his help in persuading the Jicarilla Apache Tribe to put some money
in a client's bank in Denver. 21 Nordhaus didn't know anything about the
Tribe but arranged a meeting with the Tribe's attorney, Roy Mobley. It
turned out that Mobley preferred to keep the Tribe's money in New
Mexico, and Nordhaus thought that was about as close as he would get
to Indian law. But a couple of weeks later, Mobley called and asked
Nordhaus and Davis for help in the Tribe's claim before the Indian
Claims Commission.2 Though a Washington D.C. law firm was also
working on the claim, Mobley said he wasn't receiving much help and
he needed a trial lawyer. Mobley had found the right person. "I loved
trial practice," Nordhaus says now. "It was my whole career. I always
liked to handle the whole case."
Davis and Nordhaus started studying Indian land claim cases
and bought a copy of Felix S. Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law,
which was basically the litigator's bible in Indian law. "We studied the
procedure and realized these cases lasted for years. We also learned that
we had to pay our own expenses, although the experts would be paid if
the Tribe had money."

20. Interview with Jim Beckley, Attorney, former partner with Nordhaus in the Moses
law firm, in Albuquerque, N.M. (Sept. 28, 2002).
21. Davis was a senior partner in Davis, Graham and Stubbs. This was the firm where
future Supreme Court Justice Byron White worked for 14 years before joining the Justice
Department and then being appointed to the Supreme Court by President John F. Kennedy.
22. An Act of Congress formed the Indian Claims Commission (ICC) in 1946. Indian
Claims Commission Act of 1946, ch. 959 § 1, 60 Stat. 1049 (formerly codified at 25 U.S.C. §§
70-70v-3). The court was open to all Indians in the United States. The Act's purpose was to
make the United States liable to Indians for legal, equitable, and moral wrongs. Most of the
suits filed with the ICC included resource management, accounting claims, land loss, and
water rights. As Edward Lazarus said, the Commission was formed to "look at the history
of American expansion not only as it had actually occurred but also as it ought to have
occurred." EDWARD LAzARUS, BLACK HILLS, WHITE JUSTICE: THE SIoux NATION VERSUS THE
UNITED STATES, 1775 TO THE PRESENT185-86 (1991).
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Mobley, Davis, and Nordhaus went up to the reservation to talk
about working on the Tribe's claim. The Jicarilla Apache live on an
executive order reservation located in north central New Mexico tucked
up near the Colorado border. At that time, the reservation contained
some 750,000 acres, all tribal trust property. In 1970, about 75 percent of
the 2100 people who lived on the reservation were Indian, with the
majority living in Dulce, where the tribal council met. The council
seemed receptive to adding some strong litigators to the team. The
council approved the contract, which then had to be approved by the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).
Though much has been made of the fact that that generation of
mostly white Washington lawyers who worked on the Indian land
claims made huge sums of money, it cannot be denied that taking on
such a case was a tough choice that many lawyers simply could not
afford. While Nordhaus had an agreeable partner at the time in Donald
B. Moses, Davis had to convince a large firm. A land claims case could
last years without any compensation and demanded an intense amount
of work in studying the history of the Tribe and basically recreating a
chunk of the past from the dustiest of facts.
Well suited to the task, Nordhaus gathered a posse of expert
witnesses to delve into the Tribe's past. Anthropology, archaeology, and
a heavy dose of history were needed to establish the boundaries of land
once occupied by the Tribe. Nordhaus used a ten-volume study the
Stanford Research Institute compiled from the reports of Indian agents
and military contacts. Though the Tribe had commissioned the study,
Nordhaus deposed his own authors to discredit two of the volumes that
he believed were inaccurate. He dispatched historians to the Library of
Congress and went himself to the Archives of the Indies in Seville, Spain,
to study records of the Spanish conquest in New Mexico.
Nordhaus also called in his friend Dr. Frank Hibben, an
anthropology professor whose rather flamboyant lifestyle later evoked
comparisons to Indiana Jones. Sporting safari clothing complete with a
leopard-skin hat and epaulets, Hibben was hugely popular among his
students at the University of New Mexico. They thrilled to his fantastic
tales of surviving an attack by a lion in Somalia and hunting leopards
with the Shah of Iran.24 Professionally, Hibben's claim to fame was made
in a cave in the Sandia Mountains near Albuquerque, where his
discoveries suggested the earliest human culture in the New World went
back at least 25,000 years. "Sandia Man" put Hibben on the cover of Time
magazine in 1940, but his discovery would later be called into question."
23.
24.
25.

Douglas Preston, The Mystery of Sandia Cave, NEW YORKER, June 12,1995, at 66-67.

Id.
Id. at 66.
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He was a controversial figure in his own time as well. When Davis, who
was a trustee of the Denver Museum of Natural History, checked into
Hibben's qualifications as an anthropologist, he found Hibben was
considered by his "peers" as more of a popular writer known mostly for
his adventure stories about big game hunting.
But Nordhaus hired him anyway, and it proved a lucky decision.
To establish the boundaries of the land claim, Nordhaus needed
witnesses to testify about the traditional area held by the Jicarillas. But
living tribal members could no longer recall their former territory.
Relying on his past adventures, Hibben gave Nordhaus the break he
needed.
In 1933, Hibben had rounded up wild mustangs in northern
New Mexico and southeastern Colorado with a man named Juan Dedios.
A Navajo who escaped capture by the Spaniards and married a Jicarilla
woman, Dedios had traveled with Jicarilla bands on many hunting trips
before the Civil War. Ninety at the time of the mustang expedition,
Dedios had pointed out numerous old Jicarilla campsites and told stories
about the Apaches, who as hunters and gatherers roamed over a wide
area from present-day southern Colorado into New Mexico and the panhandles of Texas and Oklahoma. Fascinated by the old Navajo, Hibben
had recorded his tales and made sketches of the campsites.
Though Dedios was long dead by the time of the land claim case,
he proved to be the star witness. In the fall of 1957, Nordhaus took to the
field with Hibben and a couple of tribal members to revisit the campsites
Hibben had sketched 25 years earlier. With Nordhaus and Hibben in a
pickup and the tribal members following in a carryall, the group
searched for proof that the Jicarillas had occupied a vast amount of
territory compared to their present reservation, information they needed
to establish aboriginal title to the land. Scouting the whole area from the
Piedmont Plateau east of the Canadian River all the way up to the
Colorado border, then up and down the Arkansas River, and over and
up into the San Luis Valley in Colorado, the group looked for places
where the Jicarilla Apache made camp as they followed the buffalo.
Hunkering down near high places where they could watch for plumes of
dust raised by the huge migrating herds, the Jicarillas left behind circles
of rock that anchored their tipis. Two hundred years later, the tipi rings
were still there, and Nordhaus and Hibben searched for these campsites
as proof of the Jicarillas' range. The group also visited the sacred sites of
the Jicarillas, including Tucumcari Butte, where the buffalo hunters laid
their hands on the stone to ask for good luck in the hunt.
By marking the campsites, Hibben mapped out a rough border
of the Jicarillas' ancestral lands. To satisfy the requirement of the claims
commission that the occupancy of the Jicarilla Apache had been exclusive from time immemorial, Hibben distinguished the Jicarilla campsites
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from those of the plains Indians. Unlike the campsites of the Comanche,
the Jicarilla tipi rings faced eastward toward the rising sun.
With Juan Dedios unavailable to testify, Hibben was left to tell
the story of the Jicarilla Apache to the Indian Claims Commission, and as
Nordhaus recalls, Hibben had the commissioners eating out of his hands.
The ghosts of Juan Dedios and Elfego Baca most certainly were smiling,
as the government lawyers did not even bother cross-examining Hibben.
In 1971, the Jicarilla Apache Tribe won $9 million in the land
claim that had dragged on for 24 long years, and in 1972 the Tribe settled
a separate accounting claim for the mismanagement of rents and
6
royalties received by the Tribe for another $7 million. While such large
sums seemed like a lot in local papers,' to the Jicarilla Apache and other
tribes who received cash for their former land, the money could not
begin to compensate them for what they had lost. Still, the victory gave
the Tribe the cash and confidence to continue to press their claims in
court. It also gave the Tribe reason to trust Robert Nordhaus, who had
spent 14 years on the two cases. He became the Tribe's general counsel,
and forever after, Indian law was his passion.
Eventually, Nordhaus would break away from the Moses firm,
whose partners weren't interested in Indian law, and form his own firm
of Nordhaus, Haltom and Taylor. ("Donald Moses," explains Nordhaus,
"was a top lawyer and a long-time friend. Our objectives just differed.")
The new Nordhaus firm moved into a "horrible" round building in
downtown Albuquerque. Every time the wind blew, it whistled through
the walls. Hiring eager attorneys just out of law school, the firm started
out existing "hand-to-mouth" as it tried to specialize in Indian law.
Though Nordhaus had other interests in real estate and skiing,
he remembers that when the chance to represent the Jicarilla Apache
Tribe came along, he had become captivated by the field of Indian law. "I
really think it is the most interesting field of law," Nordhaus says. "You
have a chance to help people who need help. In my opinion there are so
many problems that the tribes have in dealing with outsiders. You have
to be careful to protect their interests in every possible way. You have to
26. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. U.S., 25 I.C.C. 227 (1971). The commission recognized 14
million acres of the claim that was then chopped down to 9 and one-half million after
subtracting land grants. Id. at 227-28. The land was valued at the time of the taking so the
Tribe's compensation amounted to $1.08 an acre.
27. At the attorney's conference in the district court case, Judge Payne would question
Nordhaus about publicity suggesting Nordhaus earned $3.5 million a year representing the
tribe. Transcript of Attorney Conference at 12, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 77292-P (D.N.M. Dec. 29, 1977). By statute the attorneys were limited to 10 percent of the
claim. After this was divided among all the attorneys who worked on the land claim,
Nordhaus said his firm got $200,000. Of that, Nordhaus figures he personally received
$80,000, which worked out to about $10 an hour.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 43

scrutinize everything that is done, every contract and every activity involving outsiders."
When pressed, Nordhaus tries to explain what it meant to enter
Indian law late in his life as a lawyer when the tribes were just starting to
feel their way to more powerful positions, and increasingly were turning
to the courts in their efforts to combat the crippling poverty of the
reservations. Though tribes have become more adept at exercising their
legal and political powers, it was a unique time in history, when they
called on lawyers to fight their battles, lawyers who were for the most
part strangers to the reservations. "In many ways they were like children
when I first started working with the tribes," Nordhaus says of that time.
"Now they are getting more sophisticated. But there are always
outsiders trying to take advantage of them, especially the resource-rich
tribes."
III. IMPOSING THE TRIBAL SEVERANCE TAX
As the Tribe's attorneys, Nordhaus and his partner B. Reid
Haltom developed the idea of the severance tax that produced Merrion
because the Tribe wanted to improve the reservation's economy and
have more money for government projects. The Jicarillas also wanted to
control natural resource production on the reservation. Since the early
1950s, the Tribe had entered into agreements with about 20 oil
companies including giants such as Mobil and Gulf and smaller
independent producers such as Merrion. By the 1970s, these leases for
mineral development covered 69 percent of the 750,000-acre reservation.
The BIA approved the agreements and the tribe received cash bonuses
and royalties in exchange for the exclusive right to drill, mine, extract,
and remove the oil and gas deposits from the leased lands. The terms of
the leases were for ten years and could be extended as long as oil or gas
was produced in paying quantities from the land. 8
With royalties from oil and gas, the Tribe's annual income rose
to over $3 million in the 1970s, but there were problems with these
leases, which were written at a time of weakness for many tribes. As the
Tribe saw it, the agencies in charge of administering the leases for the
tribes were not doing a good job in preventing underpayment of
royalties, pressing for diligent development of the leases, and protecting
the environment.
A Government Accounting Office (GAO) report in 1979
estimated that Indian tribes and the federal government had lost millions
in royalties because of the failure of the Department of the Interior to
28. The leases were approved by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to the Mineral
Leasing Act of 1938, 25 U.S.C. § 396a-396g (2000).
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enforce proper payment.2 Yet the Tribe was dependent on the Interior
Department for enforcement of the provisions of the leases.
Even during the height of the energy crisis, when Americans
were lined up at the pumps and government policy clamored for
increased domestic oil production, the agencies did not help spur
development. Lease provisions demanded that companies produce "in
paying quantities," but this proved to be a loose legal term that worked
against the tribes. Companies could sit on a lease for 10 years and then
drill one well and start pumping at the last minute in order to keep a
lease indefinitely. Many leases from the 1950s were held by one
producing well. 3° "The moral of this story is, if you're going to enter into
any kind of lease or agreement, you want your leases developed,"
31
Nordhaus said in 1979 at a seminar on Indian natural resource law.
The Jicarilla Apache Tribe was also afraid that after the depletion
of its mineral resources, it would be left high and dry economically. As
the Tribe would state in its trial brief, the purpose of the tax levied
against minerals severed from the reservation was to fund tribal gov32
ernment operations after resources had been depleted.
Fueled by the successful litigation before the Indian Claims
Commission (ICC), the Jicarilla Apache Tribe had the money and the
desire to embrace the federal government's new policy of selfdetermination by seizing control of its own resources. As Charles
Wilkinson writes in Fire on the Plateau,

The tribes became much more aggressive in asserting their
sovereignty-their right to act as governments. Dispensing
with the outside paternalism and their own passivity that
had built up over the course of a century, tribal
governments took charge of their reservation during the
1970s and early 1980s. The BIA's dominance began to fade.
These changes also remade energy development in Indian
Country in the Southwest. 3
Frustrated by the federal government dragging its feet with its
trust responsibility, the Jicarilla Apache Tribe decided to confront oil and
gas companies who had not been paying royalties as provided in the
Gov'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OIL AND GAS ROYALTY COLLECTIONS: SERIOUS
29.
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS NEED CONGRESSIONAL ATTENTION, (FGMSD-79-24,

Apr. 13, 1979).
30. Robert Nordhaus, Oil and Gas, SEMINAR ON INDIAN NAT. RESOURCE LAW & FIN.
(Am. Indian Law. Training Program, Oakland, Cal.), May 1979, at 129.
31. Id. at 131.
32. Defendant's Trial Brief at 3, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 77-292-P &
Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 77-343 (D.N.M. Dec. 29, 1977) (consolidated cases).
33. WILKINSON, supra note 17, at 109.
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federal leases. In March of 1973, Nordhaus wrote to the Secretary of the
Interior demanding enforcement of leases. More than a year later the
department replied, saying it was looking into it. Rather than continue to
wait for the Secretary to act on its complaints of underpayment of
royalties, the Tribe flexed its legal muscle and brought suit seeking
enforcement. The extensive litigation Nordhaus initiated against the oil
and gas companies, including Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy
Corporation,led to judgments ordering substantial additional payments.3
In the process, Nordhaus and Haltom realized that the oil and
gas lessees essentially had unlimited access to the reservation, subject
only to spacing regulations and limited environmental controls that
could be imposed by the BIA and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS).
"In all of these cases," Nordhaus says, "I would get a gut feeling
that somebody was lying and that they did not follow the law. It seemed
that the USGS, the BIA, and the Department of the Interior were not
paying any attention to the law and regulations. They were in bed with
the oil companies."
By this time, Nordhaus was working so much with the Tribe on
its legal claims that he purchased a private plane with a partner and
started flying the 180 miles from Albuquerque to Dulce to attend council
meetings. Flying over the reservation in the Cessna one summer,
Nordhaus and Haltom looked down at the great gray bowl of the San
Juan Basin dotted with bobbing oil wells and scribbled gas pipes. They
noticed that roads used by the oil and gas companies cut in straight lines
across the valleys and along the ridge tops of the San Juan Basin instead
of following the contour lines to avoid environmental damage. The Tribe
did not have the financial resources to monitor well drilling, road
building, or other actions of the energy companies. The royalties
received barely covered the costs of ordinary government operations.
"Bill Haltom and I were convinced that the Tribe was not receiving
sufficient payments for its royalties to operate its government and
monitor operations of oil and gas companies," Nordhaus recalls. "We
looked into other ways to bring money to the Tribe."
The State of New Mexico already collected severance taxes on
production on the Jicarilla Apache Reservation; the attorneys decided the
Tribe should follow suit. "I don't think we did a lot of research on the
severance tax issue," Nordhaus says. "We just said, 'Well, everybody
taxes-cities, states, everybody."
At the next meeting of the tribal council, the attorneys
recommended that the council approve the imposition of a tribal

34.

728 F.2d 1555 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 479 U.S. 970 (1986).
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severance tax on production on the reservation.n Haltom drafted the
ordinance using New Mexico statutes as a guide, and then Nordhaus
submitted it to L.D. Ortega, field solicitor of the Department of the
Interior. After Ortega approved a revised version of the severance tax,
the Tribe adopted the ordinance.
The Supreme Court would later make much of the fact that the
Tribe followed the proper channels in getting their ordinance approved
by the BIA. Justice Marshall cited these "federal checkpoints" as an
assurance that tribes would deal fairly with non-Indians.'
In fact, the path through the administrative labyrinth was a little
murkier. After the Tribe approved the ordinance in July 1976, Nordhaus
forwarded it, as required, to the area office of the BIA for final approval,
and there it sat for 120 days. It did not die a bureaucratic death, however;
the Tribe's constitution provided that any ordinance not approved by the
area superintendent or area office within 120 days automatically became
effective.
In December 1976, Nordhaus recalls, "I went to the area office
and met with acting area director Lloyd Nickelson and said, 'This tax has
been in your office for over 120 days and under the tribal constitution
any ordinance that has not been approved within 120 days becomes
effective. Therefore, you might as well sign it.' I showed him a copy of
the constitution and after a while he said, 'I might as well sign it.' So it
became effective."
After the severance tax was approved, the Tribe sent all the
lessees doing business on the reservation copies of the ordinance and a
notice that the taxes would be assessed. Fifteen days before the tax was
due, the Tribe got its response. The 19 oil and gas companies filed suit
asking for a preliminary injunction to stop the tax. The companies had a
laundry list of claims against the ordinance: it violated due process
because the companies were not provided notice or hearing for the tax, it
35. Adopted under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, the Jicarilla Apache Tribe's
Constitution required all ordinances to be approved by the Interior Department. Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576-16, 48 Stat. 984, 987 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 476 (2000)).
In 1969, the tribe revised its Constitution to include Article XI, which provides, "The
inherent powers of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, including those conferred by § 16 of the Act
of June 18, 1934 (48 Stat. 984) as amended, as vest in the tribal council and shall be
exercised thereby subject only to limitations imposed by the Constitution of the United
States, applicable statutes and regulations of the Department of Interior and the restrictions
established by this revised Constitution." CONST. OF THE JICARILLA APACHE TRIBE, art. XI.
Subparagraph (e) of Section 1, Article XI, further provides, "The tribal council may levy
and collect taxes and fees on tribal members, and may enact ordinances, subject to approval
by the Secretary of the Interior, to impose taxes and fees on non-members of the tribe doing
business on the reservation." Id. at § l(e). The Secretary of the Interior approved the revised
Constitution on February 13,1969.
36. See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 155.
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violated due process because those on the reservation were not required
to pay the tax, it changed royalty rates on leases in violation of the terms
of the contract, it exceeded the authority of the Tribe because Congress
had specifically restricted the Tribe's power to tax by enacting the Indian
Reorganization Act in 1934, and it violated the Commerce Clause of the
United States and discriminated between intrastate and interstate
commerce.
"I guess nobody thought it would work," Nordhaus recalls. "I
am not sure if we really thought it would work either. We definitely did
not expect the sudden reaction we got."
IV. TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY ON TRIAL IN THE NEW MEXICO
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT
The district court suit was brought in the names of J. Gregory
Merrion and Robert L. Bayless, both small oil and gas producers.3 7 "They
got the smallest operators to be the named plaintiffs," Nordhaus says.
"They wanted them to be named first because they wanted to show how
the little guys would be put out of business by the exorbitant taxes."
At the hearing on the preliminary injunction on June 17, 1977,
the Tribe faced the biggest and most respected firms in New Mexico,
who represented the oil and gas companies as local counsel. As far as the
local attorneys went, Nordhaus recalls, "They were all old time attorneys
and we were good friends; we had had a very good relationship with
them."
One attorney Nordhaus would find himself squaring off against
during the litigation was Bruce Black, one of the lawyers representing
the Merrion plaintiffs. Black was a partner in a Santa Fe firm with Jeff
Bingaman, who would go on to become a U.S. Senator, and Jack
Campbell, a former New Mexico governor. Though Nordhaus had
served on the governor's economic development team and remained
friendly with him, Nordhaus did not know Black very well at the time.
Nordhaus and Black must have been an interesting contrast.
With more than 40 years of legal experience, the feisty Nordhaus was
almost 70 when the Merrion case started. Black, a handsome man with a
deep voice that carries well in the courtroom, was 30 and just six years
out of the University of Michigan Law School. Though the team of
lawyers representing the oil and gas companies deemed Black too young
to argue the case when it reached the U.S. Supreme Court, Black led the
pack in the early stages.
37. Two lawsuits were consolidated for trial: Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe (No. 77292) and Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe (No. 77-343). Between the two cases, 21 oil and
gas companies were involved. For a list of the plaintiffs, see supra note 2.
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Starting out the hearing, Black argued for the oil companies that
the tax was unconstitutional, a violation of interstate commerce, double
taxation, taxation without representation, and a violation of the Equal
Protection clause. Black saved the strongest fire in his opening argument
for an attack on tribal sovereignty, by saying, "I think the doctrine of
Indian sovereignty upon which the Indians no doubt rely with regard to
their powers of tax, is perhaps a misnomer, and also is out of context in
this situation." m Black then quoted from a law review article that
proposed that "tribal sovereignty as a force in itself has been purely a
legal fiction for decades." 39 In some cases, Black argued, tribal
sovereignty seemed to be even more of "a fantasy." 4° Suggesting that
tribal sovereignty could be totally disregarded to reach what the court
felt was an equitable result, Black concluded in his opening remarks that
because it was not equitable to impose a tax without representation, the
oil companies deserved an injunction against the tax.1
To win an injunction, the plaintiffs needed to establish that the
tax would cause irreparable harm to consumers and to the companies.
To prove this, Black called as his first witness Tom Dugan, one of the
smaller independent producers. Dugan, who had eight leases on the
reservation, said he was worried about the impact of the tax on leases
that might not be producing in paying quantities, and that the tax might
result in the tribe canceling some leases. Obviously chafing from the
Tribe's success in demanding the diligent development of leases, Dugan
referred to the recent crackdown by federal agencies on monitoring well
production. He said he had marginal wells that would not operate
profitably with the tax.4 "By the imposition of this tax it becomes more
likely that you would have to shut the well down and turn it over to the
Tribe?," Black asked Dugan.43
"It just makes it that much harder to make a profit, you bet.""
On cross examination, Nordhaus honed in on Dugan's
comments that because a particular well was marginal, the entire lease
38. Transcript from Hearing on Preliminary Injunction at 45, Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, No. 77-292-P & Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 77-343 (D.N.M. Dec. 29,
1977) (consolidated cases).
39. Id. Black is quoting from R.W. Oliver, The Legal Status of American Indian Tribes, 38
OR. L. REv. 193, 231 (1959).
40. Transcript from Hearing on Preliminary Injunction at 46, Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, No. 77-292-P & Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 77-343 (D.N.M. Dec. 29,
1977) (consolidated cases).
41. Id. at 46-47.
42. Id. at 62-63.
43. Id. at 63.
44. Transcript from Hearing on Preliminary Injunction at 63, Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, No. 77-292-P & Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 77-343 (D.N.M. Dec. 29,
1977) (consolidated cases).
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might be unprofitable and have to be forfeited to the Tribe. "What is
your cost of operation of that one well?" 5 Dugan said he didn't know,
but admitted his costs were "relatively low" because it was not a very
good well. Nordhaus then asked whether the lease was producing in
"paying quantities."
"The lease is, yeah. The USGS says it is, yes, sir."6
Nordhaus wanted to show that one well did not determine
whether a lease produced in paying quantities. It was the total
production that mattered.
The only other witness Black put on the stand was William S.
Jameson, the vice-president and general counsel for Supron Energy
Corporation, to testify that there was a provision in the leases that no
regulations of the Department of the Interior would affect royalty rates
without consent of the lessees. After confirming that Supron had not
been given notice or any right to participate in deliberations regarding
the tax, Black pursued a line of questions that portrayed the severance
tax as an attempt to grab more royalties.
Assuming the Secretary of the Interior approved the Tribe's
does the Jicarilla tax, in effect, increase
severance tax, Black asked, "How 47
the royalty that Jicarilas receive?"
"Your honor," Nordhaus broke in, "I object to the characterization of the tax as a 'royalty.' It is a tax, not a royalty."'
Judge Payne said he understood, but let Black's questioning
continue.
"So it increases the amount they received from
49 the production of
the same gas, without any contractual negotiation?"
"It increases the total dollars that the Tribe would receive from
the same quantity of production," Jameson responded.5°
"Have the Jicarillas ever brought a lawsuit against Supron
seeking increased royalties?" Black asked.-"
one pending in the United States
"Yes," Jameson said, "there 5is
2
District Court here in Albuquerque."
45. Id. at 67.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 70. In the early stages of the district court litigation, Black hotly contested the
validity of the approval process for the tribal ordinance, which was an issue the plaintiffs
dropped-perhaps prematurely considering its importance to the Supreme Court-at the
start of trial.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 71.
50. Transcript from Hearing on Preliminary Injunction at 71, Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, No. 77-292-P & Amoco v. Jicarilia Apache Tribe, No. 77-343 (D.N.M. Dec. 29,
1977) (consolidated cases).
51. Id.
52. Id. See also discussion of the Supron case, supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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Cross-examining Jameson, Nordhaus also asked about the
pending litigation against the oil companies for underpayment of
royalties. As Nordhaus saw it, a litigant must come into court seeking
injunctive relief with clean hands. He wanted to pin Jameson down on
whether Supron had performed its contract obligations with the Tribe.n
Judge Payne cut off this line of questioning as irrelevant and said that the
Tribe would have to try that issue in the other suit.'
Perhaps raising clean hands would have clouded the issue, but
from the Tribe's point of view it was a great irony of the Merrion
litigation that the oil and gas companies were crying foul to a change in
contract without consent, when so many of them were not honoring the
contracts they had made with the Tribe.
Nordhaus also found it ironic that the companies had not
challenged the state severance taxes, which had recently gone up.
"Do you consider the increase of the severance tax on state lands
to be a violation of the state's lease changing the royalty rate?" Nordhaus
asked Jameson. "Have you complained to the state on that score?" 55
Jameson said Supron had no intention of protesting the state
severance taxes.5
When it was the Tribe's turn, Nordhaus presented witnesses to
testify to the impact and need for the tax, including Dr. Alfred Parker,
chairman of the economics department at the University of New Mexico.
Hired by the Tribe, Parker had conducted an economic impact analysis
of different taxes that resulted in the Tribe selecting the severance tax.
Parker testified that the effect of the tax on the California consumer for
the price of natural gas would amount to about 15 cents a year. For the
New Mexico consumer, the tax would increase the cost of natural gas by
74 cents a year. 517
When Black cross-examined Parker, he wasn't interested in
pennies. He asked Parker to estimate the total revenue the tax would
generate. Parker answered that the Tribe would collect nearly $2 million
annually from taxing natural gas alone, and a small amount from oil
because not much was produced on Jicarilla land.8
In his closing argument, Black reiterated that the severance tax
would cause irreparable harm to consumers and the oil and gas

53. Transcript from Hearing on Preliminary Injunction at 77-81, Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, No. 77-292-P & Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 77-343 (D.N.M. Dec. 29,
1977) (consolidated cases).
54. Id. at 81.
55. Id. at 83.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 136-37.
58. Id. at 141-42.
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companies and called for a preliminary injunction to preserve the "status
quo."59
Arguing for the Tribe, Nordhaus said that the plaintiffs had not
presented any evidence contradicting Parker's analysis that the cost for
consumers was minimal. The only evidence the plaintiffs presented on
the potential economic impact to consumers was Jameson's testimony
that the tax would increase the cost of gas to consumers. Jameson simply
concluded that costs would go up because the severance tax would cost
Supron an estimated $40,000 a month. At least with gas the companies
would not have to absorb this cost but could pass the tax liability on to
consumers.6° As for the companies, Nordhaus disregarded Dugan's
problem with one unprofitable well. In his mind, none of the testimony
established that any lease failed to produce in paying quantities as a
result of the tax. Nordhaus also pointed out that the ordinance provided
a remedy for refunds for overpayment of taxes, giving a taxpayer the
right to appeal to the tribal council and, if necessary, to take legal action
under the laws of the United States. Because the plaintiffs could not
establish that they would not get their money back if the tax was later
no threat of irreparable harm needed for a
found invalid,
. was
61
. . . . there
preliminary injunction.
Disregarding all of the Tribe's arguments, Judge Payne decided
in favor of the oil and gas companies and granted the preliminary
injunction. Though this was just a temporary halt to the severance tax,
the hearing gave a strong indication of what both sides would argue at
the trial. The plaintiffs' argument boiled down to the view that the Tribe
did not have the sovereign power to tax. The Tribe fired back that the
Supreme Court had confirmed the power of Indian tribes to tax nonIndians on reservations. Nordhaus appealed to the judge to look at what
the law had been in the United States for 200 years. "As long as Congress
does not specifically deprive Indian tribes of the right62 to tax," he told the
court, "the tribes retain that as a sovereign attribute."
The trial on the permanent injunction was held before Judge
Payne on August 29, 1977, more than two months after the initial hearing
on the preliminary injunction enjoining the Tribe from collecting the tax.
Now the courtroom filled with oil company lawyers, who took over the
jury boxes and the first two rows of the rest of the room. Each company
had New Mexico counsel, in-house counsel, and outside attorneys. There

59. Id. at 146.
60. Transcript from Hearing on Preliminary Injunction at 87, Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, No. 77-292-P & Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 77-343 (D.N.M. Dec. 29,
1977) (consolidated cases).
61. Id. at 148-49.
62. Id. at 95-96.
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were so many lawyers, one of the attorneys representing the oil
companies sat at the table of the Tribe's counsel. "I guess there were 40
or 50 oil company representatives," Nordhaus recalls, "and there were
four of us. We figured with all the lawyers they had, that the companies
represented somewhere between $10 to $20 billion arrayed against us in
the case, which was formidable."
The plaintiffs started by announcing that after the pretrial conference the only issue before the court was the validity of the tax. "Well,"
Judge Payne observed, "Mr. Nordhaus is springing to his feet."6 Nordhaus protested that the issue of clean hands and performance of the
leases was relevant. Again, Payne refused to hear about it.'
Black waived his opening statement and quickly moved through
his presentation of witnesses. He called two smaller producers, Tom
Dugan and Robert Bayless, whose testimony echoed that of Dugan's at
the hearing on the preliminary injunction. He also called Gene Lamb, the
director of gas sales for Continental Oil Company, who testified that the
company would owe the Tribe $75,000 for three months of taxes.'
When Nordhaus had his turn to question the sales director, he
pounced. "Mr. Lamb, were you aware of the agreement made between
Continental Oil Company and Gas Company of New Mexico [in July
1977] in settlement of a suit brought by Continental in the district court
of Santa Fe County on gas prices?" 6
"Yes, sir."
"Do you know what the wellhead price of your gas sold intra67
agreed upon in that settlement?"
was
state
Black didn't get it, and the judge didn't either.
"Well, your honor," said Nordhaus, "the claim is made that this
tax is a burden upon the plaintiffs and the consumers, and that it is an
unreasonable burden on customers, and we are trying to show that if
there is any burden on consumers, it results from an agreement made by
various plaintiffs with Gas Company of New Mexico to double the price
of gas in the intrastate market, and that had effect on the whole market
and as a result of that, it also [practically] doubled the severance tax. " 6
In a pattern that would become familiar, Judge Payne sustained
Black's objection to this line of reasoning and Nordhaus was forced to
tender his proof for the record.
63. Transcript from Hearing on Permanent Injunction at 194, Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, No. 77-292-P & Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 77-343 (D.N.M. Dec. 29,
1977) (consolidated cases).
64. Id. at 195.
65. Id. at 219.
66. Id. at 222.
67. Id. at 222-23.
68. Id. at 223.
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In his opening statement, Nordhaus had outlined the Tribe's
position starting with the sovereign power to tax and then tried to
explain the purpose of the tax. "We were trying to show the need of the
government to tax to provide services for the people," Nordhaus
explains now. "We were also trying to show the relatively small amount
of money expended by the state to provide services to the tribe." The
Tribe spent about $3 million per year on services that benefited both
Indians and non-Indians, while the state spent $300,000. The Tribe had
20 tribal police on the reservation, while the state provided one
policeman. Nordhaus wanted to point out that one state policeman was
incapable of policing a reservation that encompassed three-quarters of a
million acres. In addition, the Tribe spent a lot of money on community
services and the BIA operated the schools. "So the state really provided
no services," Nordhaus says. But when Nordhaus tried to put the Tribe's
economic development planner on the stand as his first witness to testify
to the need for the tax, the plaintiffs' attorneys objected. "I don't see
what relevance the Tribe's plans for use of its resources have to do with
the validity under the law of the oil and gas severance tax," said John
Cooney, who represented Amoco and Marathon.69 Black would echo
these sentiments, saying, "Your Honor, I don't think the governmental
needs of the Tribe have anything to do with it. I mean, whether or not
the Tribe needs the money is irrelevant to whether or not this tax is
vaid."70 Judge Payne didn't see the relevance either. "Well, all the way
through this trial I have71 been wondering if I was at the pretrial
conference. I don't know."
Once again, Nordhaus made a record for appeal. "We will
expect to show by this witness that the Tribe has made a long-range
study of its needs for development of resources, its needs for
development of revenues to support tribal operations, its needs for
creating employment on the reservation. We will tender proof to show a
very low per capita income, a very high unemployment rate, an effort by
the Tribe to utilize the resources, to improve the condition of tribe
members over a long period of time, to provide education for tribal
members, to provide employment, to provide social services, and thatthere will be a requirement to use its royalty income for industrial
uses." n

69. Transcript from Hearing on Permanent Injunction at 256, Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, No. 77-292-P & Amoco v. Jicarifla Apache Tribe, No. 77-343 (D.N.M. Dec. 29,
1977) (consolidated cases).
70. Id. at 282.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 256-57.
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When Nordhaus tried to introduce testimony from Dr. Parker on
the economic impact of the tax, Payne again sustained objections, finding
the information irrelevant. "So he'd already decided without any
evidence that the tax was unconstitutional," Nordhaus says looking back
on the trial.
To make a record for an appeal, Nordhaus had Parker read from
his written report that the tax would add an eighth of a cent to the price
of gas and an infinitesimal amount he couldn't even measure on the
price of oil. When Parker was done, Black got up and started to crossexamine. "I objected because the testimony and his economic report
were not admitted as evidence," Nordhaus says. "Payne sustained that
objection. Bruce Black looked perplexed and sat down."
Later, Parker's testimony, never formally given, would be
extremely important to the Supreme Court. At the second oral argument,
Nordhaus would aim this argument directly at the Court's newest
member, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who he thought would be the
crucial vote, by discussing the cost and difficulties of providing
government services on the Navajo Reservation. Nordhaus thought that
as an Arizonan, O'Connor would be familiar with the problems of states
providing services across a reservation covering millions of acres and
three states. That much territory required a large police force and
department of justice. "In no way could three states, certainly not one
state, provide services for that reservation. I think that was the most
crucial bit of information," Nordhaus says looking back, "because Justice
Marshall said to maintain tribal governments it is essential for the tribes
to have the right to tax to sustain the tribal government and provide
governmental services. If there weren't any governmental services, of
course, it wouldn't have occurred to them."
At the trial, Nordhaus also tried to offer Veronica Tiller as an
expert witness on the need for the tribal tax. Dr. Tiller was a professor of
history at the University of Utah and the first Jicarilla Apache to receive
a Ph.D. "Why do you want to put in her testimony?" Judge Payne asked.
"Just to prove she has a PhD?" Again, Nordhaus had to tender the
evidence of the other experts, and the trial that was expected to last days
wrapped up in one.
It was perhaps no surprise to those who watched the trial that
Judge Payne would rule in no uncertain terms that the severance tax was
illegal, unconstitutional, invalid, and void. Payne held that the tax was
not valid because the Tribe lacked the authority to enforce it. The court
stated that only state and local authorities had the power to tax oil and
gas production on tribal lands and any additional taxes would place an

73.

Id.at 297.
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excessive burden on the companies. In addition, the district court held
that the tax violated the Commerce Clause. 74
Payne's decision would prove a hollow victory for the oil and
gas companies. But there is much in what happened in the district court
of relevance to today's federal Indian law jurisprudence. What took
place in the district court was a showdown over the concept of tribal
sovereignty.
To fully understand the origins of tribal sovereignty requires
going back to "time immemorial."75 In Johnson v. McIntosh, Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, and Worcester v. Georgia, Justice John Marshall
established a foundation for federal Indian law called the Marshall
trilogy that remains viable to this day by recognizing the inherent tribal
sovereignty of the original inhabitants.76 The Marshall trilogy envisioned
the Indian nations as separate governments, dependent on federal
authority but independent of state control. Though tribes were distinct
governments before the United States formed, the Marshall Court had
found limitations on their sovereignty in just two ways, in their ability to
alienate land' and to engage in foreign relations.78 In Worcester, Marshall
concluded his trilogy with a strong endorsement of tribal sovereignty by
country.7
holding that the laws of a state could have no force in Indian
He found that Indian nations were "distinct, independent political
communities" having territorial boundaries within which their authority
is exclusive.'o
In Williams v. Lee, which ushered in the "modern era" of federal
Indian law in 1959,81 the Court continued to pay homage to the paradigm
of tribal sovereignty developed in the Marshall trilogy by saying "the
basic policy of Worcester has remained."8 2 In addressing tribal powers
throughout the modem era, the Court honored the early and
longstanding presumption that tribes possess all powers of inherent
sovereignty unless Congress expressly divests them of a power by treaty
or statute. 3 Early decisions of the federal courts enforced the concept that
74. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537, 537 (10th Cir. 1980), affd, 455 U.S.
130 (1982); Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and Judgment of the District Court of
New Mexico, Joint Appendix at 127, 135, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130
(1982) (Nos. 80-11 & 80-15) (consolidated with Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe).
75. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832).
76. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1
(1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).

77.
78.
79.

Johnson, 21 U.S. at 543.
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 1.
Worcester,31 U.S. at 561.

80.

Id. at 559.

81.

CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW 1 (1987).

82.
83.

Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217,219 (1959).
See COHEN,supra note 16, at 241-42.
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tribal sovereignty included the power to levy taxes upon non-members
doing business on the reservation.84
Nordhaus's mission was to show that tribal sovereignty was
more than a platonic notion, as it was called by the Supreme Court in
1 9 7 3 ,n but was actually a tool for governing. By imposing a severance
tax, the Tribe could pay for the cost of government services and plan for
the future when its natural resources had been depleted. In doing so, the
Tribe would fulfill the stated federal policies of self-determination. But
every time Nordhaus tried to introduce evidence that demonstrated the
Tribe's cost of services and plans for the future, he was denied. In the
end, Judge Payne never really tried to wrap his mind around tribal
sovereignty.
Despite all the precedent and policy affirming tribal sovereignty,
presenting it as a viable force to those outside Indian Country has always
been a tremendous struggle made all the more difficult as tribes confront
the pressures of modernization. As the Jicarilla Apache Tribe adapted to
changing circumstances on the reservation, it made a conscious decision
to no longer passively accept the way the powerful companies dealt with
it. Though the reservation sat on a rich bed of natural resources, the
Tribe saw that federal agencies had failed to enforce its trust
relationship, that the oil and gas companies could not be counted on to
deal fairly with the Tribe, and that despite the income from mineral
wealth the Tribe needed to do more to improve the economy because the
resources would not last forever. To take charge, the Tribe needed the
concept of tribal sovereignty to be flexible enough to accommodate a
dynamic view of self-determination by including the power to tax.
The oil companies' attorneys filling the courtroom, however,
relied on a static picture of the Tribe. At the trial, Black would drive
home the notion that royalties received from oil and gas operations on
the reservation-$3,995,489 in 1976-made up almost all of the Tribe's
annual income and more than covered the cost of government services.'
The suggestion seemed to be that it was incomprehensible that the Tribe
didn't just accept the rather large amount of royalties the companies
were already bestowing on them and be grateful. But from the Tribe's
point of view, a government should not have to pay for the costs of its
services from royalties, but from taxes. That's what governments do.

84. See Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 599 (1906);
Maxey v. Wright, 54 S.W. 807 (1900), affid, 105 F. 1003 (8th Cir. 1900); Morris v. Hitchcock,
194 U.S. 384 (1904); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956).
85. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
86. Transcript from Hearing on Permanent Injunction at 270, Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, No. 77-292-P & Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 77-343 (D.N.M. Dec. 29,
1977) (consolidated cases).
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In his trial brief, Black would argue that the Tribe had no
business imposing a severance tax because oil and gas were not
traditionally an "integral part of the Indian social and cultural
heritage." 87 Therefore, there was no "historical connection between the
regulation of oil and gas and tribal self-government." Black quoted at
length the comments of Utah Land Commissioner Frank J. Allen from a
law review article:
Indians do not require oil to carry on their traditional
economic and social activities. There is nothing about
Indian culture which contributes to the value of oil or
which should instill in Indians an appreciation for the
substance, apart from the revenue it provides. Oil
conservation is the vital concern of the white public, not the
Indian, and the accident of the oil's location beneath public lands
set apartfor Indians does not reduce the need for its conservation
in the interest of white culture.'
To support the idea that Indians did not have any traditional or cultural
connection to oil and gas production, Black pointed out that the Jicarilla
Apache and 23 other western tribes had met with Arab oil producing
countries to tap into their expertise in developing reservation resources. 81
As the energy crisis loomed, raising the specter of OPEC gaining
a hold on domestic oil production in the 1970s probably struck the right
chord with many non-Indians. But trading on fear ignored the fact that
the tribes turned to outsiders only after being burned by the oil
companies and only after the federal government did not live up to its
trust responsibility.
In 1970, after the Arab oil embargo, the head of the Federal
Energy Administration summoned Indian leaders to Washington, D.C.,
to discuss the idea of the federal government taking over the
management of energy resources on the reservations. The Indian
representatives, including Peter McDonald, then president of the Navajo
Nation, and Robert Nordhaus, the only attorney present, resisted. As
Nordhaus recalls, "We thought, 'Why let the government do this? Why
don't we form an organization and let the government help us."'
That evening, the Indian leaders hurried over to the apartment
of LaDonna Harris, head of Americans for Indian Opportunity, and

87. Brief for Merrion and Bayless at 20, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 77-292-P
(D.N.M. Dec. 29, 1977).
88. Id. Black is quoting from 5 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 59, 70 (1960) (emphasis added
by Black).
89. Brief for Merrion and Bayless at 20, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 77-292-P
(D.N.M. Dec. 29, 1977).
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Nordhaus drafted by-laws and articles of incorporation for what became
the Council for Energy Resource Tribes (CERT). The next day, the newly
formed CERT presented the government officials with the firm resolve
that the tribes wanted to manage their own resources. From these initial
attempts to consolidate control, CERT grew to 57 tribes by the time of its
twenty-fifth anniversary in 1995.
To see the existence of oil underneath the reservation as an
accident that tribes should just ignore was to deny all Indians the power
to adapt to changing circumstances. In the face of an attitude that oil was
white man's business and that the federal government should take over
the only wealth some tribes had, it was no wonder the tribes turned to
the Arab oil producing countries for help. If the federal policy was to
support economic self-sufficiency and self-determination, the tribes who
chose to follow this path and develop their resources needed room to
govern as other governments did. They needed tribal sovereignty.
V. NEAR THE CENTER OF THE EARTH
History is one of the most important sources for federal Indian
law. To truly understand the importance of the Merrion case for the
Jicarilla Apache requires looking at the Tribe's incredible journey
through the maze of federal Indian policy over the past 100 years. Two
photographs help provide reference points. In one, taken in 1880, a
handful of representatives of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe pose in
Washington, D.C. They have gone there on a mission to try to persuade
Congress to give them a reservation. In the other, taken in 1981,
representatives of the Tribe stand on the steps of the Supreme Court on a
drizzly March afternoon. Dwarfed by tall columns, standing under the
motto "Equal Justice Under Law," the Jicarilla Apaches have taken their
case to the nation's highest court. In the century that separates those two
moments, it is truly amazing that the Jicarillas survived at all.
Anthropologists would label the Jicarilla Apache an Athabaskan
people, who came down to the southwest from Canada sometime
between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries.' As the Jicarillas would
tell it, all life on earth originated from the Jemez Mountains, a mountain
range of austere beauty in northern New Mexico. Marked by the
boundaries of four sacred rivers: the Arkansas, Canadian, Rio Grande,
and Pecos, the traditional territory of the Jicarilla Apache stretched over
50 million acres. The Jicarillas deemed this homeland "near the center of
the earth." 91 For a long time the area's rugged terrain, ranging from
90. VERONICA E. VELARDE TILLER, AMERICAN INDIAN RESERVATIONS AND TRusT AREAs
444 (1996).
91. VERONICA E. VELARDE TILLER, THE JICAR1LLA APACHE TRIBE: A HISTORY 3 (2000).
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semiarid desert to high mountains, isolated the Jicarillas from the
intrusion of Spanish, Mexican, and American settlers. The Jicarilla
Apaches roamed in bands across a wide area, moving with the seasons
as they hunted, gathered food, and cultivated some crops. But by the
mid-1880s, competition with newcomers resulted in the Jicarillas being
separated from their traditional land.92 Though the Jicarillas objected to
being jumped around like grasshoppers, they were sent to live on the
Mescalero Apache Reservation in south-central New Mexico while tribal
leaders tried to win support for a home of their own.93
The Jicarillas met with delay after delay in establishing a reservation. "The Jicarilla Apache Indian has no home," the special agent for
the Tribe wrote in 1876, "As a people, they have no country that they can
call their own." 94 Treaties establishing a reservation were never ratified.
Finally, the area that became their present reservation was set aside by
executive order on February 11, 1887. Though the reservation was a
comparatively small place, about sixteen miles wide and 30 miles long,
and not part of their traditional homelands, the Jicarilla finally had a
permanent home. 95
Over the next few decades, tribal members would struggle to
establish themselves economically. Though the Dawes Act ushered in a
policy of assimilation in 1887 by attempting to break up communal
ownership and turn Indians into farmers by giving them individual
allotments of land, the scheme was a complete failure on the Jicarilla
reservation. 96 Government agents admitted that the Indians could not
support themselves by raising crops on this "bleak mountainous tract. "9
The little available farmland was often snatched up by non-Indian
settlers, who also took up the best grazing land. Some of these settlers
had no right to be there, but the government proved ineffective in
removing the squatters. The government also failed to complete a survey
that was needed before the allotment program could be implemented.
Thus, the allotment program was abandoned on the Jicarilla reservation,
which was probably a blessing for the Tribe. Unlike many western tribes,
the Jicarilla did not suffer the adverse effects of allotment, which across
the rest of the country resulted in millions of acres passing into non-

92. TILLER, supra note 90, at 444.
93. ROBERT J. NORDHAUS, TIPI RINGS: A CHRONICLE OF THE JICARILLA APAcHE LAND
CLAIM 97 (1995).
94. TILLER, supra note 91, at 244.
95. Id. at 97.
96. Id. at 99-117.
97. Petitioner's Memorandum Brief at 10, Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. U.S., 25 I.C.C. 248
(1971) (No. 22-K).
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Indian hands and created checkerboard patterns of ownership that
spawned difficult jurisdictional issues.98
Without a way to earn a living, the Jicarilla had to rely on government provisions to survive. But these rations were mishandled, often
at the corrupt hands of the Indian agents, and it was not unusual for
clothing and blankets marked U.S.I.D. (U.S. Interior Department) to end
up in private stores.9 Many Jicarilla died from overexposure and starvation. In their weak state, the Jicarilla easily fell prey to disease, including
measles, influenza, and tuberculosis, and in 1920 the tribal population hit
a low of 588.10
To lessen the impact of the competition for grazing and
farmland, the federal government increased the reservation in 1907 to
provide a winter range for tribal livestock. With this southern addition,
the Tribe increased its sheep herd, and over the course of a few decades
the reservation economy had basically recovered. Ironically, it was this
southern addition, granted because the government failed to do
anything about the squatters taking up reservation land that was legally
the Jicarillas to use, "that was eventually to produce oil and gasresources that would provide the Jicarillas with a substantial income. " ' °1
Though the San Juan Basin looked like a barren, godforsaken place, it
was a broad bowl filled with thick sequences of sedimentary rocks,
providing the sources and natural reservoirs for oil and gas.
The Tribe's economic recovery corresponded with the Indian
Reorganization Act (IRA), which in 1934 ushered in yet another federal
Indian policy that backed away from assimilation. The Jicarillas
organized themselves under the IRA, drafted a constitution, and elected
a tribal council.1 2 One of the powers the newly formed tribal council
possessed included signing leases with oil and gas companies, and largescale drilling began soon after the discovery of oil and gas in the
southern part of the reservation. In 1950, receipts from the sale of leases
alone amounted to about $250,000, and the tribal budget rose from
$50,000 in 1954103 to more than $1,000,000 in 1959.'
Meanwhile, the 1960s and 1970s saw big changes in federal
Indian policy toward self-determination. "The time has come to break
decisively with the past," President Nixon said in 1970, "and to create

98. TILLER, supra note 91, at 99-117.
99. Petitioner's Memorandum Brief at 17, Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. U.S., 25 I.C.C. 248
(1971) (No. 22-K).
100. TILLER, supra note 91, at 131.
101. Id. at 117.
102. Id. at 159-69.
103. Id. at 183, 196.
104. Id. at 196.
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the conditions for a new era in which the Indian future is determined by
Indian acts and Indian decisions. " ln5
Not long after reporting that Judge Payne had ruled the
severance tax illegal,"° the Jicarilla Chieftain07 quoted a Government
Accounting Office report on implementation of the Indian SelfDetermination Act as saying that the BIA "continues to believe that its
policy of non-interference in the tribal decision-making process is one of
integrity."'0° Just under this article, the paper reprinted an article from
the December 1977 Reader's Digest that lauded the Jicarilla Apaches as a
Tribe of 2200 entrepreneurs with a $4 million a year oil and gas leasing
operation.
Prospering since settling on the reservation in 1887, the
nonmilitant, savvy Jicarillas built a strong council and involved the whole tribe in their enterprises. Through an
elected president and eight council members, they hold a
multi-million-dollar balanced portfolio of blue chips and
other stocks, says president Leonard Atole: "It's the same as
the U.S. government. We have a constitution and charter.
Our officers are elected and we are a self-governing entity."
Self-financing, too.1
It may have been a geological accident that after being forced
onto unproductive land, the Jicarilla Apache Tribe ended up sitting on
huge reservoirs of resources that were valued by the outside world. But
in taking advantage of this hidden wealth and winning accolades for
their financial success, the Tribe was winning a hard-fought battle to
survive that lived up to the federal government's policy of selfdetermination. To be able to control natural resource production would
help the Tribe fulfill the purpose of the reservation, to preserve a homeland where the Jicarilla Indians could determine their own future.

105. See GETCHIES, supra note 15, at 226, citing H.R. Doc. No. 91-363, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(July 8, 1970). Soon after Nixon's pronouncement, Congress passed the Indian Financing
Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1544 (2000); the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n (2000); and the American Religious Freedom
Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C § 1996 (2000).
106. Tax is Ruled Illegal, JICARILLA CHIEFrAIN, Jan. 16, 1978, at 2.
107. The Jicarilla Chieftain's masthead includes the names of the council members and
the motto: "Independent in Politics, Optimistic in Disposition, Impartial in Religion,
Published so that the Jicarilla Apache Tribe may have a spokesman and a champion."
108. Reader's Digest Lauds Jicarilla,JICARILLA CHIEFTAIN, Feb. 13, 1978, at 12.
109. Id.
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VI. THE JICARILLAS APPEAL TO THE TENTH CIRCUIT
As soon as District Judge Payne ruled against the severance tax,
the Jicarilla Apache tribal council approved an appeal and allocated
money for it. As the case headed for the Tenth Circuit, Robert Nordhaus
didn't have a sense of what Merrion might mean to other tribes. "I really
didn't think much about the total impact," he recalls years later. "I was
really representing the Jicarilla Apaches."
But the importance of the case quickly became recognized
beyond Dulce. The States of Utah, New Mexico, Montana, North Dakota,
and Wyoming all filed friend-of-the-court (amici) briefs in opposition to
the Jicarilla Apache Tribe. While the State's power to tax on the
reservation was not directly at issue in Merrion, these western states
feared a tribal tax could only cause problems for states that wanted a cut
of the revenue derived from mineral-rich reservations."' By chance,
another tax case from New Mexico involving a different Apache TribeO'Cheskey v. Mescalero Apache Tribe"-arrived at the Tenth Circuit
exactly at the same time as Merrion, and O'Cheskey did involve the state
taxing problem. A decision in O'Cheskey in favor of the imposition of
state taxes on reservation activities was bound to indirectly undermine
the Merrion claim to sovereignty. In the Tenth Circuit, the two different
cases became more and more closely entwined, first in the minds of the
western states, then in the minds of the Tenth Circuit justices, and
ultimately in the curious proceedings that led to the Tenth Circuit's final
Merrion decision.
In the meantime, in support of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, the
Navajo Nation, the Arapahoe Nation, the Shoshone Indian Tribe, the
Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes, the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort
Berthold Reservation, and the National Congress of American Indians all
filed amici briefs.
The Tribe's argument on appeal echoed the one before Judge
Payne: the power to tax is an attribute of sovereignty that is essential to
the existence of self-government and extends to everything within a
tribe's territorial jurisdiction. In response to the arguments of the States
and the oil and gas lessees that the Jicarilla tax discriminated against
interstate commerce, Nordhaus argued that that conclusion misrepresented the Tribe's severance tax. Instead of being levied only against oil
110. After Merrion, the state's power to impose severance taxes on non-Indian oil and
gas producers in Indian country alongside a tribal tax was confronted in Cotton Petroleum v.
New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989). Tribal advocates see Cotton Petroleum as a threat to tribal
sovereignty because allowing both taxes could put those who wish to do business in Indian
Country at a disadvantage.
111. 625 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1980).
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and gas produced on the reservation and sold and transported off, the
tax was even-handed and imposed on all producers, tribal members and
non-members alike.
The attorneys for the oil companies repeated their main argument: the Tribe had the rights of a proprietor to impose fees on persons
'entering the reservation to do business and this the Jicarillas had done
when they entered into the original oil and gas leases. The Tribe did not
have the additional and different powers of a sovereign to tax the gas
removed.
In the spring of 1979, after the briefing was done, Nordhaus
learned of the three-judge panel initially assigned to hear and decide the
Merrion appeal. Under existing Tenth Circuit appellate rules, the Chief
Judge of the Court of Appeals had the job of assigning three of the seven
judges then on the court to decide particular cases.1 12 The assignments
were made more or less randomly. But if a particular judge had an
interest in an issue, then more likely than not he would end up on the
panel.'13 Two of the Tenth Circuit judges on the initial Merrion panel,
Circuit Judge William Holloway, Jr., from Oklahoma and Circuit Judge
Monroe G. McKay from Utah, were relatively unknown to Nordhaus.
The third member of the original panel was the Chief Judge himself,
Oliver Seth from New Mexico, a long-time Nordhaus family friend from
Santa Fe.
Appointed to the Tenth Circuit in 1962, Seth served as chief
judge from 1977 to 1984. Supreme Court Justice Byron White, who had
once roomed with Seth at Yale Law School and who later would play a
pivotal role in Merrion in the Supreme Court, had been influential in
getting Seth appointed to the federal bench in 1962.114 Much beloved by
his former law clerks, Seth is remembered as a great big man of gentle
manners who almost never lost his temper."' Nordhaus, however, was
not pleased to see Chief Judge Seth presiding over the original Merrion
panel because he thought Seth, as a student of New Mexico legal history,
might respond negatively to the Jicarillas' underlying claim of Indian
sovereignty.
On May 17, 1979, Nordhaus, accompanied by Terry Farmer of
the Moses law firm, went to Denver to argue the Merrion appeal before

112. Panel Composition and Case Assignment, in PRACTITIONERS GUIDE TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 10TH CIRCUIT, 2ND REV. (Dec. 1981).
113. Telephone Interview with Tom Udall, U.S. Congressman from New Mexico,
former law clerk for Chief Judge Seth (Nov. 30, 2002).
114.
DENNIS HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE: A PORTRAIT OF
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 301 (1998).

115. Telephone Interviews with Marc Casillas, Attorney, former law clerk for Chief
Judge Seth (Nov. 11 & Dec. 9, 2002).
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the three-judge panel.1 '6 No transcript or recording of the argument
survives, but Nordhaus remembers Holloway and McKay as interested
in Jicarilla sovereignty and Seth as extremely polite and gracious in the
questions he asked. "I always say," Nordhaus laughs now, "you should
be unhappy when a judge is too cordial."
As Nordhaus recalls, Judge Seth found it significant that the
Tribe already received money from royalties and suggested that the
Tribe was unilaterally changing the terms of the contracts by adding a
severance tax. "It's a basic principle of law that taxes and contract
provisions are completely separate and every court recognizes that,"
Nordhaus says, "but even Judge Seth made that argument, that this is
something that the Tribe pulled over on the poor oil companies after
they had made their wonderful contracts with the Indians. They didn't
even comply with the terms of the contract in the first place."
According to Nordhaus, it also bothered Judge Seth that the
companies did not agree to the tax. He thought the tax should have been
part of the lease agreement by consent. He was worried about taxation
without representation, a concept Nordhaus tried to counter by pointing
out that oil companies doing business in foreign countries submit to
other sovereigns all the time without a right to vote or participate in
government.
Finally, Seth was concerned about the exact nature of the Jicarilla
Tribe's interest in the executive order reservation where the oil and gas
wells were located. Behind the question lurked the notion that at best the
Tribe had a proprietary interest in its lands, an interest not sufficient to
support the sovereign claims that underlay its power to tax. When at the
oral argument Seth asked Nordhaus for the executive order documents,
Nordhaus did not have them with him. At Seth's request, Nordhaus later
Tenth Circuit clerk and he distributed them to the
delivered them to11the
7
parties.
the
of
rest
After the argument before the three-judge panel, all the
attorneys and their clients sat back and waited. Based on Seth's
questions, Nordhaus anticipated the worst. In the normal course of
events, the three members of the panel would have met immediately
after the oral argument. There they would have agreed on a result in the
case and assigned one of the panel members to begin the process of
writing an opinion.118 But no written opinion from the original three116. See Assignment of Cases for Hearing at the May 1979 Term, U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit (Apr. 10, 1979) (listing the case for argument at 2 PM on May 17, 1979)
(on file with the University of New Mexico School of Law Library).
117. Letter from Howard K. Phillips, Clerk of the Tenth Circuit, to Judges Seth, Holloway, and McKay (May 17, 1979) (on file with the University of New Mexico School of Law
Library).
118. Telephone Interview with Tom Udall, supra note 113.
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judge panel exists. As Judge McKay, one of the members of the panel,
explains today, "Typically if we had filed an opinion, it would be
published. If there had been one, it would have been part of the
record." " 9 But as far as McKay can remember, he and Judge Holloway
disagreed from the beginning with Chief Judge Seth's limited view of the
Tribe's power to tax. The disagreement was borne out when the Tenth
Circuit finally decided the Merrion case more than a year later and
Judges Holloway and McKay ended up on opposite sides of the decision
from Chief Judge Seth.
Instead of deciding the case after the oral argument before the
three-judge panel, the Court of Appeals decided to rehear the case with
all seven Tenth Circuit judges sitting en banc. The notice to all counsel
said "that the Court would like the argument directed to the sovereignty
issue."120
This was an unusual procedural path for the case to take. In the
rare instances when the Tenth Circuit decided to hear or rehear cases en
banc, a party dissatisfied with the decision of a three-judge panel would
trigger the procedure by filing a motion. In even rarer instances, the rules
authorized a majority of the circuit judges on their own to order an en
banc proceeding. But, said the rules, this alternative would only be
chosen to maintain the uniformity of the court's decision or to decide a
question of exceptional importance.2
Thinking back 20 years later to the Court of Appeals' en banc
rehearing of Merrion, Judge McKay says he can't remember all details of
the decision. He recalls that it was a time when the highly collegial court
only nominally followed the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
"Our approach was very informal," McKay recalls. "My guess is
that Chief Judge Seth said to the other judges that we probably ought to
take Merrion en banc because of the importance of the issue and we
probably had a vote and got the consent of the court. Undoubtedly,
Chief Judge Seth felt very strongly about the issue. About this time, I
persuaded the Chief Judge that if anybody felt strongly about an issue,
the whole court ought to take it up, not just a panel, and for a few
months we decided to hear a lot of cases en banc."
The one additional factor that may have pushed the Tenth
Circuit to rehear Merrion was the O'Cheskeylu Indian tax case from New
119. Interview with Judge Monroe McKay in Salt Lake City, Utah (Jan. 10, 2003). All
subsequent quotes from Judge McKay are drawn from this interview.
120. Letter from Howard K. Phillips, Clerk of the Tenth Circuit, to All Counsel in the
Captioned Cases (July 24, 1979) (on file with the University of New Mexico School of Law
Library).
121. See Rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, in PRACTITIONER'S
GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT, supra note 112.
122. O'Cheskey v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 625 F. 2d 967 (10th Cir. 1980).
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Mexico, working its way simultaneously through the appeals process.
The same July 24, 1979, letter directing the Merrion lawyers to reappear
on September 12 before the whole Tenth Circuit also directed the
O'Cheskey lawyers to reappear for an en banc hearing on the issue of
Indian sovereignty."
That fall, Nordhaus went back to Denver to argue Merrion again,
this time before seven judges. Judge Seth, he remembers, was his same
courteous self. Judge McKay was the same charming, exuberant
inquisitor. Nordhaus doesn't remember much about the rest of the panel
in the short 20 minutes allotted to him and his Jicarilla Apache tribal
clients. 114 But this time the Jicarilla Apache Tribe won. On February 22,
1980, the Tenth Circuit reversed District Judge H. Vearle Payne's initial
decision."
In an opinion written by Circuit Judge James Logan, the majority
held that the Jicarilla Tribe has the power to tax non-Indians on their
land because of inherent tribal sovereignty. The court also held that the
tax did not violate the Commerce Clause and was neither discriminatory
nor a multiple burden on commerce. In the five-to-two en banc decision,
only Judges Seth and Barrett dissented. 6
For Seth, dissenting at all was unusual. Seth's clerks and his
colleagues on the court agreed that the Chief Judge saw dissents as a
waste of time. 27 "He didn't believe in dissenting," says Tom Udall, now a
U.S. Congressman from New Mexico who clerked for Seth, "unless he
'
felt really upset about a decision." 28But dissent he did in Merrrion and
that dissent both reflected his strong views on tribal sovereignty as
filtered through a unique New Mexico perspective and set the stage for
the Supreme Court battle to come.
In his Merrion dissent, Seth would refer to the 1848 Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo, transferring sovereignty over New Mexico from
123. Letter from Howard K. Phillips, Clerk of the Tenth Circuit, to All Counsel in the
Captioned Cases (July 24, 1979) (on file with the University of New Mexico School of Law
Library).
124. The second Merrion oral argument originally allotted 30 minutes to a side. On July
31, 1979, Chief Judge Seth reduced the time to 20 minutes so that all sides in the
"companioned" O'Cheskey and Merrion cases would have the same 20 minutes. Order, July
31, 1979, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980) (Consolidated with
Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe) (Nos. 78-1154 & 78-1251).
125. Merrion, 617 F.2d at 537.
126. Id. at 551-56.
127. Telephone Interview with Eric Hall, Attorney, former law clerk for Chief Judge
Seth (Oct. 26, 2002).
128. Telephone Interview with Tom Udall, supra note 113. A Westlaw search performed
by Ronald Wheeler, Reference Librarian, UNM Law School, on December 2, 2002, found
that between 1964 and 1990, Judge Seth wrote 690 opinions, while dissenting 62 times and
concurring 24 times.
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Mexico to the United States, as the "zero line" for claims to sovereign
status because of the treaty's power to extinguish previous governmental
status. A Jicarilla claim to continuing sovereign status struck him as
weak. Under pre-1848 Spanish and Mexican rule, New Mexican
authorities had barely acknowledged the Jicarillas as anything more than
a loosely affiliated group of wandering marauders. 129 The 1848 treaty,
thought Seth, had certainly not enhanced that status and nothing since
had changed it. Relying further on the subsequent history of New
Mexico, Judge Seth wrote,
Not only are there no federally created governmental
entities within the states provided for by the Constitution,
but it also does not contemplate the existence of other
"nations" within the boundaries of the United States.
Obviously, there is no place for them in the government
structure therein created.'13
Stating that the Enabling Act recognized Indians only as landlords or
possible landowners, Seth concluded that the Tribe was not a sovereign
and instead was like any other landowner in relation to the leases with
• 131
the oil and gas
It was unclear how Seth developed his dissent over the long
course of the Merrion case in the Tenth Circuit. While Seth usually
involved his clerks in his opinions, sometimes terrifying them with the
sound of his cutting and pasting parts of memoranda they had written to
construct a decision of his own, 132 none of them recalls working with him
on the Merrion dissent. Some speculated that it was just the kind of rare
case that he kept to himself, one clerk remarking that Seth was "a big
bear of a man and Merrion was one of the cases that the judge may have
wrapped his own arms around." 1" Finally, while Seth was in the
minority in Merrion, he was in the majority in Merrion's companion case
in the Tenth Circuit, O'Cheskey v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, and also
authored the opinion that upheld the power of the State to tax the gross
receipts of private contractors working on the reservation, a holding
much more compatible with his limited views of Indian status than

129. MARIA E. MONTOYA, TRANSLATING PROPERTY: THE MAXWELL LAND GRANT AND
THE CONFLICT OVER LAND IN THE AMERICAN WEST: 1840-1900, 24 (2002).
130.
131.
132.
Office,
133.

Merrion, 617 F.2d at 553.
Id. at 552-53.
Telephone Interview with Mary Catherine McCulloch, Attorney, U.S. Attorney's
Albuquerque, NM, former law clerk for Chief Judge Seth (Sept. 26, 2002).
Telephone Interviews with Marc Casillas, supra note 115.
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Merrion turned out to be. This majority opinion his clerks recall working
endlessly on."
In any case, it remained for Circuit Judge Monroe McKay's
concurring Merrion opinion to take most direct issue with Seth's use of
history. "I didn't think," Judge McKay says today, "that the majority
opinion was addressing adequately Judge Seth's notion that Indians are
just corporations."
Instead of starting in 1848 as Seth had done, McKay backed up
and looked at the origins of tribal sovereignty.
For the most complete examination, we should begin in
pristine times, or at the very latest with 1788 and the
ratification of our fundamental law. At that moment there
were at least four, not three, entities recognized by the
Constitution. There was, of course, the federal government.
There were, of course, the states. There were, of course,
13'
foreign nations. And there were "the Indian Tribes."
Judge McKay took issue with the idea that the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo extinguished the governmental powers of the
Jicarilla Apache and he said that just because the Tribe did not have a
treaty, this did not change its historic status. "A congressional failure to
ratify a treaty does not convert a 'nation' into a voluntary association,"
he wrote.'3 Contrary to Chief Judge Seth's view that tribes were most
analogous to proprietary and fraternal bodies, Judge McKay said that
"tribes have characteristics of sovereignty" those groups do not enjoy. "If
we were to deny the importance of sovereignty in our analysis, we
1 37
would be ignoring the clear dictates of the Supreme Court." Part and
parcel of the concept of sovereignty for Indian nations was the principle
of self-determination, which McKay said was not shared by voluntary
organizations, required protection of territoriality, and gave tribes
13'
"governmental authority over nonmembers in many instances."
Acknowledging that the federal government has the power to confirm or
grant tribes powers needed to operate as governments, McKay said, "It
simply does not make sense to expect the tribes to carry out municipal
functions approved and mandated by Congress without being able to
" 39
exercise at least minimal taxing powers. '

134. O'Cheskey v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 625 F. 2d 967 (10th Cir. 1980); see also
Telephone Interview with Tom Udall, supra note 113.
135. Merrion, 617 F.2d at 549 (McKay, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 549-50.
137. Id. at 550 (McKay, J., concurring).
138. Id.
139. Id.
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As soon as the Tenth Circuit decision came down, the Tribe
hailed the victory as an affirmation of tribal sovereignty but immediately
braced for an appeal. The Tribe never wavered in its determination to
fight the case all the way to the Supreme Court, Nordhaus says. "After
the land claim and settlement in the accounting claim, the Tribe seemed
to have unlimited confidence in our ability, and enough money to finance these other cases." Though Nordhaus claimed to be focused on his
role as the Tribe's advocate, the Jicarilla Apache Tribe was obviously
ready to play a broader role.
The JicarillaChieftain anticipated the impact of the Tenth Circuit
decision beyond the reservation when it noted, "Many Indian tribes felt
that their sovereignty was undermined by a U.S. Supreme Court
decision in which non-Indians [who commit crimes] on reservations
could not be prosecuted by the Tribe."' 4 The article referred to Oliphant
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, a 1978 case that sent shockwaves through
Indian Country when the Supreme Court ruled that tribes could not
exert criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians on reservations but were
implicitly divested of that power due to their domestic dependent status.
After this enormous blow to inherent sovereignty, the newspaper saw
Merrion as positive. "The power to tax will offset the fear of reduced
sovereignty."'
VII. THE SEVERANCE TAX COMES TO THE SUPREME COURT
A. First Argument
Though attorneys for the oil and gas companies had no idea that
the Merrion case, when it started, would end up in the U.S. Supreme
Court, they quickly decided to petition for certiorari after losing the
Tenth Circuit en banc decision. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the
142
case.
It was an interesting time in Indian law. The Supreme Court,
after Oliphant, left tribal attorneys scrambling, unsure of where federal
Indian law was headed. Indian law advocates feared a judicially created
concept of implicit divestiture had turned sovereignty on its head."
Rather than require the federal government to limit tribal sovereign
powers expressly, the Court announced it was willing to find limitations
140.

Circuit Court Ruling Supports Tribal Sovereignty in Severance Tax Reversal Decision,

JICARILLA CHIEFTAIN, Mar. 30, 1980, at 1.

141. Id.
142. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 449
U.S. 820 (Oct. 6, 1980).
143. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial
Divestitureof Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1 (1999).
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on its own if it perceived tribes were acting inconsistently with their
dependent status. Critics clung to the hope that Oliphant would be
confined to criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
Not surprisingly, the oil and gas companies fighting the Jicarilla
Apache Tribe loved Oliphant. Citing the case 11 times in their brief, the
Merrion petitioners called for an expansion of Oliphant to civil
jurisdiction.'" To fight Oliphant, the Tribe had its own weapon in
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, which had
affirmed the tribal power to impose a cigarette tax on non-tribal
purchasers." There, the Court held that the "power to tax transactions
occurring on trust lands and significantly involving a tribe or its
members is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty which the tribes
retain unless divested of it by federal law or necessary implication of
their dependent status."'4 Distinguishing Oliphant, the Court could find
"no overriding federal interest that would necessarily be frustrated by
147
tribal taxation."
The Jicarilla Apache Tribe's attorneys would contend that the
cigarette tax in Colville could not be distinguished from the severance tax
in Merrion. Following Colville, Nordhaus insisted that the power to tax
non-members rested on inherent sovereignty. This contradicted the oil
and gas companies who argued that the power to tax only extended to
tribal members and any power to tax non-members was based on the
power to exclude them from the reservation.
The petitioners portrayed the tribal taxes in Colville as
dramatically different than the severance tax because the cigarette tax
applied to non-members who voluntarily entered the reservation as
tribal invitees with knowledge of the tax." They could vote with their
feet and decide not to buy their cigarettes on the reservation. But a pack
of cigarettes was a far cry from an oil well. Not subject to the limits on
governmental authority provided in the Constitution, tribes with general
governmental power "could expropriate property worth hundreds of
millions of dollars and banish non-Indian citizens rightfully on
reservations." 9 Not only were the facts far different, but the Court in
Colville had recognized that national concerns could override tribal
144. Brief of the Petitioners at iv, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982)
(No. 80-11).
145. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134

(1980).
146. Id. at 152.
147. Id. at 154.
148. Brief of the Petitioners at 26-27, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130
(1982) (No. 80-11).
149. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 23-24, Merrion v. Jicarila Apache Tribe, 455 U.S.
130 (1982) (No. 80-11).
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interests. Allowing tribes to tax non-Indian oil and gas producers did
give them control over an area of national concern, the country's future
energy reserves.lu
With the Supreme Court briefs in, the stage was set for the oral
argument on March 30, 1981. After months of waking up in the middle
of the night thinking up arguments, Nordhaus went to Washington a
week early to prepare. While practicing in his room at the Hay Adams
Hotel across from the White House, Nordhaus got a call from Dulce that
the tribal council wanted to attend the oral argument. Nordhaus had
already given his reserved spots to his family and had to rush to find
seats. "I called the clerk of court and said the Jicarilla Apache Tribal
Council wants seats for the oral argument. He said, 'Oh, I'm afraid of
Indians; I'll give them the seats."'
The oral argument started with Jason Kellahin, an Albuquerque
attorney for the Merrion petitioners, addressing the issue of tribal
sovereignty. Though the Tenth Circuit had concluded that the right to
tax was an inherent aspect of sovereignty, Kellahin said the Court's most
recent cases did not recognize such a broad definition of inherent
sovereignty. Rather, tribal sovereignty had been restricted by the tribe's
dependent status, which the Court had just addressed in Montana v.
United States.'5'
As Bruce Black recalls, the trip to Washington to argue before the
Supreme Court was a heady time for the New Mexico attorneys.'52 But
for those representing the oil and gas companies, the timing heightened
the thrill of being there. Black and other lawyers had flown to
Washington in December to watch oral arguments in the Montana case.
The Supreme Court released its decision in Montana the week before the
oral argument in Merrion, holding that a tribe lacked inherent power to
regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on reservation land owned by
non-members of the Tribe.13 When the decision came down, those
representing the oil and gas companies thought they would be able to
ride an Oliphant-Montanawave to victory.
"Tribal sovereignty does not extend to nonmembers of the
tribes," Kellahin told the Court. "In Montana v. United States it was held
that the exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to control the
internal relations of the Tribe is inconsistent with their dependent status,
and so cannot survive without the express delegation of authority by
150. Id. at 8.
151. Transcript of Mar. 30, 1981 Oral Argument at 7, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
455 U.S. 130 (1982) (No. 80-11; consolidated with Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 8015); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
152. Interview with Judge Bruce D. Black in Albuquerque, N.M. (Oct. 2, 2000). All
subsequent quotes from Judge Black are drawn from this interview.
153. Montana, 450 U.S. at 557.
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Congress. The case clearly holds that the same lack of tribal authority to
try non-Indians for criminal offenses as was found in Oliphant extends as
well to the civil jurisdiction.""' Though the Court in Montana
acknowledged that the Indian tribes retained inherent sovereign power
to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians, such as the
power to tax nonmembers who enter into consensual relationships with
tribes, Kellahin argued that the source for this power was based on the
right to exclude non-members and to impose conditions on their right to
enter the reservation. The companies had entered into a consensual
relationship with the Tribe, Kellahin said, and conditions on their entry
and right to remain were imposed by contract, which also provided that
royalties could never be increased. "Taxation was no part of that
contract, nor did the petitioners ever consent to taxation of that
production."" 6
Kellahin found that Colville fit right into his characterization of
as limited to a right to exclude and condition entry.
sovereignty
tribal
tax in Colville was harmless because non-members
cigarette
But the
in this case, we cannot go elsewhere, we cannot
"Here,
it.
could avoid
'
pick up our mineral interests and move away.
Oliphant, Kellahin argued, set the pattern for assessing tribal
sovereignty. He urged the Court to continue to expand Oliphant and
Montana in concluding that tribes have lost a portion of their sovereignty
by virtue of their dependent status. "Under Montana tribes cannot
exercise civil jurisdiction over non-Indians in the same sense as the
Oliphant case.""6 As oral arguments before the Supreme Court go,
Kellahin spoke for a long time without interruption. The expected
questions from the bench were mere hiccups in his prepared speech.
Next up, John Cooney, the Albuquerque lawyer representing
Amoco and Marathon, attacked the severance tax because it interfered
with interstate commerce. There were several prongs to Cooney's
argument. First, the Jicarilla tax created a multiple burden because the
1 9
state already imposed severance taxes ' Next, the Tribe's ability to
impose the tax was preempted by a 1927 law that gave the states the
express power to tax production on the reservation."6 Finally, the tax was
discriminatory. The tax ordinance would violate the Commerce Clause
154. Transcript of Mar. 30, 1981 Oral Argument at 7, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
455 U.S. 130 (1982) (No. 80-11; consolidated with Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-

15).
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 8.
Id. at9.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 12-13.
Id. at 14; see 25 USC § 398(c) (2000).
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the same way a state tax would that only applied to gas and oil that left
the state. 16 Rejecting the idea that the negative implications of the
commerce clause do not apply to tribes, Cooney said, "That would allow
287 tribal governments, we submit, to hold commerce hostage by the
fortuitous location
of urgently needed energy resources under their
162
reservations."
"What you're suggesting is," Chief Justice Warren Burger said at
one point, "the tribe is trying to collect a royalty... and then another
royalty in the guise or the form of the tax?"
"Precisely, Mr. Chief Justice. That is exactly what the tribe is
attempting here to do. " l63
Cooney challenged the suggestion that the tribe had any
reserved right to tax when Indian severance taxes were never heard of
until the late 1970s. "We think it's highly dubious that the Jicarilla selfgovernment suddenly requires in the midst of the energy crisis this new
tribal severance tax. " 16
Countering these points for the Tribe, Nordhaus said the tribal
tax fell within the doctrine the Court followed in Colville. "We think that
it falls within the statements made that tribal taxes are valid where a
tribe has a significant interest in the subject matter and that interest is the
strongest where revenues are derived from values generated on the
reservation by activities involving the tribes and the taxpayer is the
recipient of the tribal services."1' Pointing to the record made in the
district court, Nordhaus said, the Jicarilla Apache tribal government is a
very strong government.
The tribal government furnishes police, it furnishes fire
protection, it has a road department, it expends for
governmental services ten times what the State of New
Mexico spends in that area. In other words, it is clear from
the record.. .that the tribe was the only effective
government.
It is clear that these companies demand and receive tribal
services. The companies' argument is that the tribe should
provide these government services out of the royalties,
which is the tribe's compensation for the resource which
the energy companies are extracting, and they say, we
161. Transcript of Mar. 30, 1981, Oral Argument at 18, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
455 U.S. 130 (1982) (No. 80-11; consolidated with Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 8015).
162. Id. at 19.
163. Id. at 14-15.
164. Id. at 24.
165. Id. at 26.
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should have the revenues from these royalties used for our
benefit and government services should be provided from
6
these royalties, not from taxes.'
A justice questioned whether the sudden imposition of this tax
accorded with non-Indian expectations. "Well, you're saying that
Amoco, the lessee, should have known under Colville that in addition to
paying a royalty and all other charges they were going to be subject to an
Indian tax as well?" Nordhaus answered, "I think from the old cases of
this Court and of the courts since 1902, they could anticipate that Indian
governments that were required to furnish government services would
67
have to tax, otherwise Indian governments can't survive." When questioned about why the Tribe didn't take all these costs into account when
negotiating the contract and fixing the royalty, Nordhaus answered that
a sovereign government did not need the consent of the governed to levy
a tax.' 6
Then Justice Rehnquist asked a question that caused the Jicarilla
tribal members watching from the audience to shuffle uneasily in their
seats. 169 "[TIhis court has retreated from the position that Indians are sovereigns."' 7° Nordhaus responded, "Your Honor, that...doesn't really
reach the question of the sovereign power to tax. I am saying that until
that power is divested, and unless that power to tax is inconsistent with
the status of the tribe, which we say it is not, because it has been71recoghas this power."
nized over a long period of years-then the tribe
As Nordhaus recalls, Justice Rehnquist seemed swayed by the
arguments for the other side. "His questions were all directed at me. For
the most part, the Court was very polite, but Rehnquist and Stevens
asked some difficult questions. I do not think Rehnquist wanted to
understand tribal sovereignty. He was a conservative and did not believe
in tribal taxation."
Right before Nordhaus sat down, Justice Stevens threw a wild
pitch from the bench. "Why did it take the Indians so long to realize that
they had this power?"'" Twenty years later, Nordhaus still stews over
his response. "Stevens asked me a question and I have always been mad
at myself for not providing the right answer. I have forgotten what my

166. Id. at 29-30.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 32.
169. JicarillasFight Oil Companies,JICARILLA CHIEFrAIN, Apr. 6, 1981, at 1.
170. Id.
171. Transcript of Mar. 30, 1981, Oral Argument at 32, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
455 U.S. 130 (1982) (No. 80-11; consolidated with Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 8015).
172. Id. at 34.
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exact answer was. I should have said, 'They did not need to tax. They
could just take scalps.' I did not think of it at the time. I have been
thinking about that for the next time I have a chance to argue before the
Supreme Court." Would he really have said that? "Sure I would," he
insists. "Before they were put on the reservation, they were their own
people. They didn't have to tax. They could take what they wanted. They
had their own way of taxing."
Also arguing for the Tribe was Deputy Solicitor General Louis
Claiborne. On Claiborne's death in 2000, Supreme Court reporter Tony
Mauro would say that Claiborne was born to argue before the high
court.'73 Between two stints at the solicitor general's office from 19621970 and 1978-1985, and as a lawyer in private practice, Claiborne
argued more than 60 cases before the Supreme Court. Born in Belgium,
but with long family ties in New Orleans, Claiborne had lived for many
years in England and was one of the few Americans admitted to practice
as a barrister. "His clear-as-a-bell locution," Mauro remembered,
"delivered with an accent that was British by way of Louisiana, lent a
palpable dignity and sophistication to whatever he argued as deputy
solicitor general."174
Though Nordhaus didn't feel the government's attorneys had
been much help arguing on behalf of the Tribe as part of the trustee
responsibility in the lower courts, Claiborne had a reputation for taking
on most of the Indian cases for the Solicitor General's office. "They
played to his sense of history and justice," remembered a colleague, "He
helped this nation live up to its responsibilities toward Native
Americans." 3
When Claiborne got up to argue, he started by confronting
Montana head on. While Claiborne was busy trying to temper the
implications of Montana, so fresh in the minds of the justices, Bruce Black
recalls that Justice Rehnquist got up from his chair and left the bench.
Returning a few moments later with a map of New Mexico, Justice
Rehnquist asked, "Have you ever been in Rio Arriba County?"
The question once again caused a stir among the Jicarilla Apache
contingency, striking them as coming out of the blue. 176 Claibome's odd
accent or Anglophile ways must have gotten the better of Justice
Rehnquist to prompt this seemingly irrelevant inquiry. While it's only
speculation, Claiborne and Rehnquist had been at the Justice Department

173.
2000, at
174.
175.
176.

Tony Mauro, Court Mourns the Loss of the 'Other' Claiborne, THE RECORDER, May 15,
9.
Id.
Id.
licarillasFight Oil Companies, supranote 170, at 4.
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at the same time and might have had some history there that was playing out in the Court.
Seemingly nonplussed, Claiborne answered, "Ihave not, Your
Honor,"'7 and went on with his argument. He ended by taking a stab at
the question Justice Stevens had posed to Nordhaus about why the Tribe
had suddenly decided to impose the severance tax. Claiborne said that
the Tribe had only recently come to realize what was rightfully theirs.
Though the cigarette tax sustained in Colville could be seen as a new
phenomenon, a tribe's ability to tax was not a brand new idea, but "a
revival of an idea that was prevalent at the turn of the century."
Claiborne cited the old cases of Morris v. Hitchcock and Buster v. Wright as
examples that sustained the tribal power to tax and were cited with
approval by the Court in Colville."7 '
A photograph of tribal members posing with Nordhaus on the
steps of the Supreme Court after the argument later ran on the front page
of the Jicarilla Chieftain. As the paper would note, "As in decades past,
the fate of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe has been laid in the hands of nonIndians.""1 Despite a drizzly day, the group looks upbeat with raised
fists holding umbrellas.
At a reception following the first oral arguments, attorneys told
tribal members they had a better than 50 percent chance of winning."
Justice Potter Stewart did not participate in the decision, presumably
because of a conflict of interest. Of the eight justices remaining, most
observers thought the tribe could count on two to approve the Tribe's
power to tax. Because a tie would result in affirming the Tenth Circuit
decision, the Tribe only needed two more justices.
Speculating on the Supreme Court's decision, the Jicarilla
Chieftain mused on the importance of the Merrion case to Indian people.
"If the Court hands down a decision against the Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
Indian life shall continue much as it is today but without hope and

177. Transcript of Mar. 30, 1981, Oral Argument at 36, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
455 U.S. 130 (1982) (No. 80-11; consolidated with Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-

15).
178. Id. at 40.
179. JicarillasFight Oil Companies, supra note 170, at 1.
180. Id. at 4.
181. Justice Potter Stewart actually took no part in the oral arguments or deliberations
on the case. Nordhaus was afraid Justice Byron White would recuse himself because he
was a member of Davis, Graham and Stubbs in Denver when Nordhaus and Davis worked
together on the Jicarilla Apache land claim. Though White was a pretty good friend and
skied with Nordhaus, he stayed on the bench. Given White's general eagerness to avoid
any conflict of interest, Nordhaus agrees that there was no reason he should have recused
himself because he wasn't involved in any of the Tribe's legal matters. White did land on
the majority side but came very close to deciding the other way.
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potential that were present the morning of March 30, 1 9 8 1 . "',2
Acknowledging that the future of Indian peoples struggling to find
sources of revenue to support tribal government was in the hands of
eight men who were raised in mainstream American society, the
newspaper wondered if these men could conceive of a people who
believe in another way and who wish to determine their own economic
directions. 183
Recounting the argument, the Jicarilla Chieftain would comment
on the fact that the court let the lawyers talk for a long time without
interruption. What the tribal newspaper does not mention in its five
pages of coverage and photographs is what happened on that date. But
Bruce Black remembers. March 30, 1981, was the day John Hinckley, Jr.,
stepped out of a crowd and sprayed a revolver full of bullets at President
Ronald Reagan as he left the Washington Hilton. Black remembers a note
being passed down the row of justices and attributes the relatively
passive bench to the fact that the Supreme Court was subdued by the
news. He also remembers stepping out of the courthouse into chaos. As
one world tried to assert itself, another world shook.
B. The End of Term
In the 1980s, there was a virtual explosion of Indian law cases in
the Supreme Court. Despite all this activity, as Bob Woodward and Scott
Armstrong revealed in The Brethren, the justices of the Supreme Court
did not relish being assigned to write Indian law opinions. Justice John
Harlan called an Indian law case a "peewee." 84 Justice William Brennan
reportedly seethed when asked to write Antoine v. Washington, an
opinion about off-season fishing and hunting rights in Washington State.
Brennan called the assignment a "chickenshit case. " '85After irritating
Chief Justice Burger with a Christmas party skit, Justice William
Rehnquist was assigned only one case from Burger that term, "an
insignificant Indian tax dispute in Montana, " "' which he regarded as
"
punishment because he "had nothing but contempt for Indian cases. 187
The Merrion case must have been a double blow for the unlucky
justice assigned to write it because it was an Indian law case that also
involved a tax question. As Woodward and Armstrong reported,
182. licarillasFight Oil Companies, supra note 170, at 4.
183. Id. at 4-5.
184. BOB WOODWARD & ScOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT
58 (1979).
185. Id. at 359.
186. Id. at 412. The case was Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead
Reservation, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
187. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 185, at 412.
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Brennan so hated tax cases he chided that a general rule should be to
deny cert.18 Supposedly, Justice Harry Blackmun also felt he had
suffered under Chief Justice Warren Burger by receiving poor opinions
18 9
to write, including more than his share of tax and Indian cases.
'9
The Merrion assignment fell to Justice John Paul Stevens. '
the
wrote
Instead of complaining about the case, Justice Stevens
following in a memo to the conference:
My study of what has turned out to be an especially
interesting assignment has persuaded me that this case
should be decided on a quite different rationale than
seemed correct at the time of our conference. Accordingly,
with apologies for taking so much time with this important
case, I submit herewith a memorandum that will speak for
itself and that I recommend as the basis for a Court
opinion. 9'
Justice Stevens circulated a devastating opinion for the Tribe that
rejected its power to tax. Basing any power to tax on the power to
exclude non-members from the reservation, Justice Stevens concluded
that the Tribe had lost that power by entering the leases with the oil and
gas companies. 92 In this analysis, Stevens did not even need to reach the
Commerce Clause issue, because the Tribe simply did not have the
power to tax and so the severance tax was invalid.
If Justice Stevens' first memo had held sway as the Court's
opinion, the Tribe would have lost Merrion. As far as timing, a loss like
that would have been critical following so close on the heels of the
implicit divestiture case of Oliphant. Just after Montana, this would have
been a huge blow to Indian people and could basically have destroyed
188. Id. at 362.
189. Id. at 190.
190. The behind-the-scenes look at the Supreme Court's deliberations comes from the
opinion files of Justice Thurgood Marshall left to the Library of Congress. Papers of Justice
Thurgood Marshall (reproduced from the Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library
of Congress) (on file with the University of New Mexico School of Law Library)
[hereinafter Marshall Papers]. For an extensive article using the Marshall Papers to analyze
the Supreme Court's Indian law decisions, see N. Bruce Duthu, The Thurgood Marshall
Papers and the Quest for a PrincipledTheory of Tribal Sovereignty: Fueling the Fires of Tribal/State
Conflict, 21 VT. L. REV. 47 (1996). See also David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier:
The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, n.201 (1996),
which addresses Marshall's files from the Merrion case in a footnote.
191. Memorandum from Justice John Paul Stevens to the Conference (June 1, 1981)
(Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-11; Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-15), in
Marshall Papers, supra note 190.
192. First Draft Opinion of Justice Stevens (June 1, 1981) (Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, No. 80-11; Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-15), in Marshall Papers, supra note
190.
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the concept of tribal sovereignty long honored by precedents and
principles at the heart of federal Indian law.
Within days, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist agreed
to join the opinion.193 Justice Brennan informed Stevens that he would
await the dissent.'94
Soon after the March oral argument, Justice Brennan had asked
Justice Marshall to write the dissent, saying, "Dear Thurgood: You,
Byron and I are in dissent in the above. Would you care to take the dissent." 9' Responding immediately, Marshall said he would give it a try.196
At this point, it appears from the memos that Justice Blackmun
was planning to write another dissent. "Because I agreed with Thurgood
at Conference that the Jicarilla possess the sovereign power to levy the
challenged severance tax, I shall await his dissent on this point,"
Blackmun wrote in a memo to the conference,
As my dissent in Commonwealth Edison indicates, however,
Thurgood and I are not in agreement on the Commerce
Clause issue presented in both of these cases. I expect,
therefore, that I shall write a short opinion explaining my
view that Jicarilla should be remanded to determine
whether the tax was "fairly related" within the meaning of
the fourth-prong of the Complete Auto Transit test.'
As Justice Powell had voted at conference, he wanted to wait for
Blackmun's dissent. 98
Justice Stevens had already sent his draft opinion to the printer
once and was working on a second printed draft, but the justices were
193. Memorandum from Justice William Rehnquist to Justice Stevens (June 1, 1981)
(Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-11; Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-15), in
Marshall Papers, supra note 191; Memorandum from Chief Justice Warren Burger to Justice
Stevens (June 5, 1981) (Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-11; Amoco v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, No. 80-15), in Marshall Papers, supra note 190.
194. Memorandum from Justice William Brennan to Justice Stevens (June 2, 1981) (Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-11; Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-15), in
Marshall Papers, supra note 190.
195. Memorandum from Justice Brennan to Justice Thurgood Marshall (Apr. 7, 1981)
(Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-11; Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-15), in
Marshall Papers, supra note 190.
196. Memorandum from Justice Marshall to Justice Brennan (Apr. 7, 1981) (Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-11; Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-15), in Marshall
Papers, supra note 190.
197. Memorandum from Justice Harry Blackmun to the Conference (june 17, 1981)
(Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-11; Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-15), in
Marshall Papers, supra note 190.
198. Memorandum from Justice Lewis Powell to Justice Stevens (June 3, 1981) (Merrion
v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-11; Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-15), in Marshall
Papers, supra note 190.
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far from settled on the Merrion decision. Justice Marshall circulated his
dissent on June 25, 1981. In his first draft, Marshall acknowledged the
extra-constitutional standing of the tribe and paid homage to the
foundations of federal Indian law, including the Marshall trilogy. Going
back 150 years to Worcester v. Georgia and the words of another Justice
Marshall, the dissenting opinion made a strong connection to the legacy
that tribes were inherent sovereigns free to govern their territory.
Despite possible threats to the expectations of non-Indians and the
western states, Marshall seemed to recognize the importance of tribal
sovereignty to the Jicarilla Apache Tribe in its struggles to govern its
reservation. In resounding tones, Justice Marshall issued a powerful
view of tribal sovereignty as original and inherent and not delegated.'"
Brennan joined Marshall's opinion the next day.2w White, however, now was close to siding with Stevens.
With one reservation of some substance about which I shall
chat with you, I could make a fifth vote for Part R of your
memorandum, i.e., that an Indian tribe's power to tax nonIndians engaged in activities or transactions on tribal land
is derived from the Tribe's power to exclude. Nevertheless,
for the reasons stated in Parts I-B and II-B of Thurgood's
memorandum and without expressing agreement with any
other parts of his opinion, I would affirm the judgment
below. If there are not five for your Part II, I would affirm
but only assume that you are correct in that Part."'
With the term just days away from ending, Justice Blackmun
wrote his promised short dissent on the negative implications of the Indian Commerce Clause. "The Indian Commerce Clause cannot be used
as a sword to carve out what essentially would be foreign nations within
the United States," he wrote. Yet Blackmun said he would go along with
Marshall's opinion because Congress had explicitly provided a scheme
to secure federal approval for the Tribe's power to tax. "A court acts as
the 'final arbiter' under the Commerce Clause only when Congress has
not acted. Because here, in contrast to the situation in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, Congress has affirmatively acted, the tax is valid un199. First Draft Dissent of Justice Marshall, (June 25, 1981) (Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, No. 80-11; Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-15), in Marshall Papers, supra note
190.
200. Memorandum from Justice Brennan to Justice Marshall (June 26, 1981) (Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-11; Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-15), in Marshall
Papers, supra note 190.
201. Memorandum from Justice White to Justice Stevens (June 26, 1981) (Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-11; Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-15), in Marshall
Papers, supra note 190.
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der the Commerce Clause." 20 2 Justice Powell, who had voted with Blackmun at conference to remand, then joined as well. 203
Though the alignment of the judges by the end of June would
have given the Tribe the votes it needed to affirm the Tenth Circuit
ruling that the Tribe had the sovereign power to impose a severance tax,
the Court was ready to go home for the summer.
Perhaps too late, Stevens sent a memo to the conference on June
30 announcing that the latest version of his memorandum was ready
24
"although... you may not wish to feast on this fare immediately." 0
Justice Stevens was right. Though he re-circulated his memo on July 3,
the Court had already notified the attorneys that they would have to
reargue the case in the next term. "It was a complete surprise,"
Nordhaus recalls. "We expected the decision to come down any day."
C. Second Argument
When Nordhaus returned to argue the case again on November
4, 1981, the bench had changed. Stewart, who had not participated in the
case, had retired and President Ronald Reagan had appointed Sandra
Day O'Connor, who became the first female justice on the U.S. Supreme
Court.
"So we re-argued it," Nordhaus says.
I think we argued a little stronger on the economic impact
of the tax and the need for the tax and the services
provided for the tribe, but essentially my argument the
second time was a little better, and Stevens wasn't quite as
antagonistic as he had been. Rehnquist was obviously
arguing for the other side.
Despite her reputation as a conservative judge, Nordhaus
thought O'Connor would understand the problems of trying to govern a
reservation that overlapped three states. "O'Connor's appointment was
very fortunate for us," he says. "Being from Arizona, O'Connor
understood the Navajo reservation, understood the problems of the
Navajo." For a junior justice in her first term, O'Connor certainly did not
202. First Draft of Dissent of Justice Blackmun (June 26, 1981) (Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, No. 80-11; Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-15), in Marshall Papers,
supra note 190.
203. Memorandum from Justice Powell to Justice Blackmun (June 27, 1981) (Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-11; Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-15), in Marshall
Papers, supra note 190.
204. Memorandum from Justice Stevens to the Conference (June 30, 1981) (Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-11; Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-15), in Marshall
Papers, supra note 190.
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shy away from asking questions and brought up the problems of the
Navajo Tribe. (New Mexico visitors to the Supreme Court ladies' room
overheard criticism that she seemed to talk too much for a woman.) "She
was very interested in the economic arguments," Nordhaus says, "that
this is necessary for the tribal government, that the tribal government is
the important government for the Tribe."
Kellahin began for the oil and gas companies challenging the
idea of inherent sovereignty because the powers of all government in the
constitutional system are derived from the people.2 Sovereigns govern
only with the consent of the governed, an aspect of political control
lacking where the Tribe's tax on production and transport of oil and gas
from tribal lands was levied on non-Indians who were barred from
participation in tribal affairs. "It is our position," Kellahin said, "that the
Tribe does not have any such sovereign power except, and their right to
tax is limited to, the right to condition the entry of non-Indians or nonmembers of the tribe onto their reservations."2 Taxation was not one of
the conditions of the leases negotiated with the tribe. Prompted by a
justice as to the clause in the lease that says the tribe cannot alter the
royalty structure, Kellahin said the tax was a veiled attempt to increase
the rent and royalty. "They call it a tax, but it is adding an additional
burden on the production from the lease."2 Kellahin characterized all
the precedents involving a tribe's power to tax outsiders on the
reservation, including the recent Colville case, where the Court upheld
the Tribe's right to collect a cigarette tax, as all involving a right to
impose conditions on those who enter. Further, he said that Montana
clearly stands for the proposition that the sovereignty extends to the
Tribe's right to make its own laws and be governed by them and not to
govern others.'
"Mr. Kellahin," Justice O'Connor broke in, "the Colville case
appeared to articulate a position that it is a fundamental attribute of
sovereignty, the power to tax transactions on the trust lands."
"That is very true, Your Honor."
"There wasn't an articulation there, as I read it, of basing it on
the power to exclude non-members from the reservation. How do you
distinguish the Colville case?"2
Kellahin said that the language of tribal sovereignty in Colville
was wholly unnecessary to the decision, which could be based solely on
205. Transcript of Nov. 4, 1981 Oral Argument at 7, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
455 U.S. 130 (1982) (No. 80-11; consolidated with Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 8015).
206. Id. at 7-8.
207. Id. at 8.
208. Id. at 9.
209. Id.
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the power to exclude non-members. He attempted to distinguish the
cigarette tax and the tax in Buster v. Wright on the basis that they were
and trade under
optional. "Those who wanted to go on the reservation
210
Buster v. Wright were required to pay the tax."
"Well," replied O'Connor, "Isuppose no one is forced to go on
the reservation and buy or lease oil or mineral rights."
Yes, said Kellahin, but the difference is that the companies were
already there under valid leases before there was any tax, so this is a
modification of the leases. "We have entered into a consensual relation
with the tribe of which taxation was no part." After the companies have
spent millions developing these leases, "we can't pick2 up the leases and
1
go elsewhere. We either pay the tax or lose the lease."
Kellahin ended by pointing out that recent Supreme Court cases
had limited sovereignty step by step. First, Oliphant held that a tribe
could not exert criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians on the reservation.
"In Montana, the Court interpreted that ruling as applying also to the
civil area and for that reason, I do not feel that we
212 are really talking
about true sovereignty in the sense of the old cases.,
Nordhaus then had his chance to argue for the Tribe. "To go to
the main portion of the argument," he said, "I think we have to go back
to the statement of Felix Cohen that has often been repeated in this
Court, and is most significant, is that one of the powers essential to the
maintenance of any government is the power to levy taxes, and I think in
order to understand the problem in the situation of the western tribes
with large areas to govern, we should take a look at the Jicarilla Apache
reservation." 123 As Nordhaus began to draw a picture of the 750,000-acre
reservation in a remote, mountainous region, where the Tribe maintained an extensive road system and its own police force that served the
oil and gas producers, he was interrupted from the bench.
A justice wanted to know if the Tribe relied on a statute as the
responded,
of
the power to tax.21 "No, Your Honor," 21 Nordhaus
source
5
"We rely on the inherent sovereign power to tax."
"Did the sovereign power to tax exist before the reservation was
created?"
Nordhaus responded, "Ithink the United States in creating the
Executive Order reservations recognized the inherent power of tribes to
210. Id. at 10-11.
211. Transcript of Nov. 4, 1981 Oral Argument at 12, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
455 U.S. 130 (1982) (No. 80-11; consolidated with Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-

15).
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at 14.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 28
Id.
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tax on a territorial basis, tax non-Indians and Indians alike, and I think
this court has recognized that the power over non-Indians has a
territorial basis, but..."2 6
"But that is not true with respect to the power over Indians, is
it?"
"The power over Indians has more than a territorial basis,"
Nordhaus said.
"So the power over the members and the non-members are not
coextensive?"
Nordhaus agreed that that was correct. "The activities of oil and
gas lessees on this reservation impact tribal members and tribal lands
extensively on a daily basis. The oil companies... demand and receive the
benefits of tribal roads, tribal police protection and tribal community
services.217
A justice interrupted to ask if the power to tax stems from the
power to exclude non-members from the territory of the reservation. 8
"Your honor, I disagree completely with that thesis," Nordhaus
answered. "A power to tax that is based on a power to exclude is really
not a sovereign power. It is a power of a landlord, and none of
the earlier
219
cases really based the power to tax on the power to exclude."
Nordhaus pointed out that in Morris v. Hitchcock the tribe
imposed taxes on cattle that were already on the reservation. In Buster v.
Wright, the tax was applied to owners of business lots owned by nonIndians who by statute could not be excluded.
If the contention is that the power to tax is based on the
power to exclude, you are saying that these oil and gas
lessees who have been on the reservation for 25 or 30 years,
and whose leases may extend through production by
another 20 or 30 years, that the Tribe has no power to
change the conditions of their occupancy. In other words,
they have a diplomatic immunity forever from any change
in the conditions on the reservation. 2
It was a dramatic response to the oil and gas companies charge that they
could be held hostage by tribal sovereignty. In effect, it was the
companies who could hold the Tribe hostage with their contracts.

216. Id. at 29.
217. Transcript of Nov. 4, 1981, Oral Argument at 29-30, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982) (No. 80-11; consolidated with Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
No. 80-15).
218. Id. at 30.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 30-31.
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A justice moved quickly to a question about U.S. v. Kagama,
which stated that the only two sovereign entities recognized by the
Constitution are the federal government and the states.21 Nordhaus
acknowledged that the tribal governments are dependent sovereign
governments whose powers can be divested by Congress.
But until Congress acts, they retain those powers, as this
Court said in U.S. v. Wheeler. They retain all the powers
which they had which are not divested or which are
inconsistent with their status, and our contention is that
there is nothing in the tax power that is inconsistent with
the status of the tribes. In other words, tribal governments
cannot exist without taxation, and taxation that is
appropriate for one tribe may be inappropriate for another.
The tribes have to levy the taxes where they find the
resource on which to tax.'
Pressed to concede that there was nothing inconsistent in
limiting the previous tax cases to the exclusion theory, Nordhaus
disagreed. "Not necessarily in the language, but the facts of the earlier
cases and of the later cases surely lead to the conclusion that the tax was
not based on the power to exclude because the tax was" imposed on
22
people who already had property rights on the reservation.
"And yet you would tie it to territory?"
"I would tie it to some extent to the territory, to the reservation,
because that is the area that must be governed and a tribe must govern
its territorial area. Without taxation no government can survive. ",n 4
Nordhaus tried to steer the conversation quickly away so he
could conclude on the Commerce Clause argument but was again
interrupted. "Let me ask you this," a justice cut in. "How much a
necessity for government was there in the [Suquamishi reservation,
which by the time the cases came here that were written in the seventies
consisted of a freeway from Tacoma to Seattle?" m The reference was a
direct challenge to Nordhaus to distinguish the Oliphant case.
"I think in some cases the necessity for a strong government is
not clear, but I think in the case of this Tribe, and for instance, the6 Navajo
tribe, the case for a strong tribal government.. .can't be denied."2
221. 118 U.S. 375, 379 (1886).
222. Transcript of Nov. 4, 1981, Oral Argument at 31, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
455 U.S. 130 (1982) (No. 80-11; consolidated with Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-

15).
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 32.
Id.
Id. at 32-33.
Id. at 33.
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Nordhaus again pointed to the Navajo Reservation, which
covers almost 19,000 square miles and three states. The Navajo
Reservation has a tremendous budget and a tremendous governmental
structure, he said.
"And a tremendous income from oil."
True, said Nordhaus, "but there is a great deal of poverty, too,
Your Honor, and that income from 2oil
is the property of the landlords
27
rather than a governmental revenue.
Clearly, when the justices met at conference after this argument,
things had changed since the spring. The first indication of this in
Marshall's papers is that Marshall was now writing the majority opinion,
which he sent out to the other justices soon after the second oral
argument.28
As Stevens said in a memo, he knew it would come as a surprise
to no one that he was dissenting. He wrote to Marshall,
It seems to me that your discussion in Part II-A does not
adequately confront the critical distinction between an
Indian tribe's power over its own members, which is a
good deal greater than the power possessed by many
sovereigns, and its much more limited power over nonmembers. And in Part II-B, I do not believe you adequately
explain how a tribe can grant a lessee access to the
reservation and the privilege of extracting minerals and
thereafter impose a tax based on a power to exclude which
has been surrendered by the terms of the lease.
The dissent Stevens circulated on December 18, 1981, was very similar to
the memo he had written back in June, which would have been the
Court's opinion.2
This time, Rehnquist and Burger joined Stevens in dissent.
Though White had thought about joining the dissent, he decided to go
along with Marshall's opinion.2 ' Powell and Blackmun held out on
227. Id.
228. First Draft Opinion of Justice Marshall (Nov. 1981) (Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, No. 80-11; Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-15), in Marshall Papers, supranote
190.
229. Memorandum from Justice Stevens to Justice Marshall (Dec. 1, 1981) (Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-11; Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-15), in Marshall
Papers, supra note 190.
230. Compare First Draft Opinion of Justice Stevens (June 1, 1981) (Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, No. 80-11; Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-15), in Marshall Papers,
supra note 190, with Merrion v. Jicarilla Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
231. Memorandum from Justice White to Justice Marshall (Jan. 5, 1982) (Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-11; Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-15), in Marshall
Papers, supra note 190.
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joining the majority until Marshall toned down language that left room
for a more powerful interpretation of the Indian Commerce Clause. After
joined, and
Justice Marshall revised his opinion, Powell and Blackmun
2
the short dissent Blackmun had written was not used.1
In the final Supreme Court decision, Marshall said, "The power
to tax is an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty because it is a
necessary instrument of self-government and territorial management.
This power enables a tribal government to raise revenues for its essential
services."23 Marshall continued,
The power does not derive solely from the Indian tribe's
power to exclude non-Indians from tribal lands. Instead, it
derives from the tribe's general authority, as sovereign, to
control economic activity within its jurisdiction, and to
defray the cost of providing governmental services by
requiring contributions from persons or enterprises
engaged in economic activities within that jurisdiction.23
Even if the Court had accepted the dissent's argument that the
Tribe's only power over nonmembers was its power to exclude them
from the reservation, the Court stated it still would have allowed the
tax.n5 "Nonmembers who lawfully enter tribal lands remain subject to
the tribe's power to exclude them," Marshall wrote. Additionally, the
power to exclude includes the lesser power to place conditions on entry,
continued presence, or reservation conduct:
A nonmember who enters the jurisdiction of the tribe
remains subject to the risk that the tribe will later exercise
its sovereign power. The fact that the tribe chooses not to
exercise its power to tax when it initially grants a nonIndian entry onto the reservation does not permanently
divest the tribe of its authority to impose such a tax.2

232. Memorandum from Justice Powell to Justice Marshall (Jan. 11, 1982) (Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-11; Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-15), in Marshall
Papers, supra note 190; Memorandum from Justice Blackmun to Justice Marshall (Jan. 11,
1982) (Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-11; Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 8015), in Marshall Papers, supra note 190; Memorandum from Justice Powell to Justice
Marshall (Jan. 15, 1982) (Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-11; Amoco v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, No. 80-15), in Marshall Papers, supra note 190; Memorandum from Justice
Blackmun to Justice Marshall (Jan. 15, 1982) (Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-11;
Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 80-15), in Marshall Papers, supra note 190.
233. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982).
234. Id. (citations omitted).
235. Id. at 144.
236. Id.
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Finally, the Court held that the tax would survive judicial
scrutiny under the Interstate Commerce Clause."
D. Aftermath
When the decision finally came down in the Merrion case, the
clerk wired the Nordhaus firm that the Supreme Court had decided in
the Tribe's favor. Nordhaus recalls, "Well, I got to the office in the
morning and all the secretaries were jumping up and down and all the
guys were hugging each other. Everybody was happy. It was a big
victory."
Nordhaus recalls the Tribe also being very pleased. There was a
big celebration and they gave him a Pendleton blanket. "There is an air
of happiness around Dulce after hearing of the Supreme Court's decision
ruling in favor of the tribe in the Severance Tax Case," the editor of the
JicarillaChieftain remarked in an upbeat column, "This was a BIG one. " M
Espeedie Ruiz, the BIA superintendent of the Jicarilla Agency
who had sent the tax ordinances to the BIA Area Office in Albuquerque
recommending approval, wrote in to applaud the way the Tribe got
things done. "The exemplary efforts of the Jicarillas continue to be the
beacon light for other tribes," he wrote, adding, "It appears to me that
January, 1982, will long be remembered by the Jicarillas."2 9
The decision also made headlines across the country in the
financial press. The New York Times warned that the case was significant
for oil and gas companies because of the rich mineral deposits on Indian
lands, while United Press International hailed it as a major boost to the
rights of Indian tribes.2f
But back in New Mexico, Robert Nordhaus urged caution. As
tribes got set to initiate taxes, Nordhaus said the oil companies would be
expecting the tribes to raise taxes but they should be conservative.
The huge victory won by the Tribe was almost immediately
threatened by the Interior Department. Under orders from Assistant
Secretary of the Interior for Indian Affairs Kenneth Smith, the Bureau of
Indian Affairs proposed federal regulations to prescribe and limit the
way tribes could enact severance taxes. The regulations basically would
require tribes to prepare an "economic impact statement" that would
address the effect of the tax on mineral production, consumers, and

237. Id. at 156.
238. Mary F. Polanco, Mary Mix Up, JICARILLA CHIEFTAIN, Feb. 8,1982, at 2.
239. Espeedie G. Ruiz, Letter to the Editor,JICARILLA CHIEFAIN, Feb. 8, 1982, at 2.
240. See High Court Says Indian Tribes Can Tax Extracted Minerals, NEW YORK TIMES, Jan.
25, 1982, at D3; Court Decision on JicarillaTribe; Seen Helping Other Indian Tribes, UPI, Feb. 24,
1982.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 43

tribal revenues before enacting a tax ordinance. 24 Nordhaus thought
back ten years to the time when the government had tried to take over
resource development from the energy-rich tribes and he and Navajo
chairman Peter McDonald had had to throw the Council of Energy
Resource Tribes together to thwart the government's opposition. The
new severance-tax regulations threatened the tribes in the same way.
Due to the vigilance of CERT representatives, Nordhaus found
out at the last minute about a hearing on the proposed regulations in
Billings, Montana. Thinking the regulations would undermine the
Merrion decision, Nordhaus jumped in his Cessna 340 and cruised up to
Billings at 200 miles per hour. He remembers the trip up and back taking
7.8 hours in the air. "It was fortunate that I had a high performance
aircraft and I was able to get to Billings on short notice," Nordhaus
recalls, "or the tribal severance tax might well have been nullified."
Though the BIA claimed the rule-making process was based on
its trust responsibility over Indian resources, Nordhaus cried foul. "If the
secretary wants to kill a tax ordinance," Nordhaus told BIA officials, "he
can require an economic impact statement that's so complex as to kill
any tax." 24 Nordhaus found it ironic that the Tribe had already
conducted its own economic impact analysis through the study by Dr.
Parker introduced at the very start of the Merrion litigation in Judge
Payne's courtroom in Albuquerque in 1977. That was beyond the BIA
institutional memory, he thought.
Calling the regulations an unwarranted attempt to interfere with
the tribal legislative process, Nordhaus compared the agency's plan to a
governor telling the state legislature what procedures it must follow to
enact a law. As Nordhaus saw it, "The tribe has to satisfy itself that the
tax is fair and non-discriminatory
and provides the revenues the tribe
243
needs for services."
In the face of complaints that the proposed rules would "reduce
the Indian councils to sub-agencies of the BIA," a BIA official from New
Mexico agreed that the regulations on their face were very harsh. "You
are asking 'where does the bureau come off telling tribes how to do
(taxation)?"' 2" Nordhaus had no doubt where the idea for the regulations
came from. With the Interior Department having complete control over
the actions of the Indian governments, he thought the oil companies
could continue to get their way through political pressure. Nordhaus
says now, "The BIA was nervous, very nervous, about the Tribe's tax
plan because it had never supported the Tribe in its taxation and was
241.
242.
243.
244.

Maij Charlier, BIA Tax Plan Angers Tribes, BILLINGS GAzETrE, July 15, 1982, at 20.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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always sympathetic to the oil and gas companies. The BIA very seldom
supported the Tribe and the USGS never enforced the provisions of the
leases favoring the tribes. So actually the companies went to the BIA and
Secretary of the Interior to see if they could discourage the use of the tax
plan and nullify it more or less by requiring an economic impact analysis."
As Nordhaus charged at the meeting, the BIA wanted to
overrule the importance of the Supreme Court's Merrion decision with
regulations that would emasculate the tax. The official in Billings had to
concede that the BIA had no statutory authority for writing the
regulations. The BIA never made the regulations official.
VIII. EPILOGUE
Today, as a result of Merrion, most tribes in the United States
with mineral production on their land impose a severance tax on
2
minerals extracted from their land. " The ability to impose such a tax is
critical for tribes because of the federal government's dwindling budgets
for tribal operations. These taxes allow tribes to generate revenue on the
reservation to support their governments. According to Nordhaus, "The
Merrion case serves as an example that tribes are no longer content to sit
around and allow themselves to be taken advantage of by non-Indian
businesses."
Tribal sovereignty offered concrete benefits to a tribe in the
remote, semiarid corner of north central New Mexico. The Jicarillas have
made the most of the victory. Using the courts to strengthen its hand, the
Tribe has taken a leadership role in the development of natural
resources. Staying active in CERT, the Tribe continues to press for the
best return on resource production on the reservation.
On June 25, 1980, when it bought Palmer Oil Company, the
Jicarilla Apache Tribe "became the first tribe to take 100 percent
2
ownership of oil and gas production." 4 Meanwhile, the Tribe has used
the money from the severance tax to buy up land around the reservation,
increasing the size of the reservation by 10 percent. Buying up
neighboring ranches has given the Tribe the chance to reclaim some of
the land they lost to the U.S. government when the Jicarillas were
confined to the reservation in the 1880s. Thus, the tax has helped fuel
2 7 the
of the earth.
Tribe's attempts to secure its homeland near the center
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Long after the oil and gas companies lost their bid to stop the
Jicarilla severance tax, Merrion still haunts some of the players in the
litigation.
Though J. Gregory Merrion, the president of Merrion Oil and
Gas Corporation, would complain that double-taxation by the state and
Indian tribes has had a "devastating" impact on his business over the
years, reducing his company's net to 32.9 percent in 1990, Merrion is still
in business on the reservation.2 4
Bruce Black, now a federal district judge in Albuquerque, faced
the ghost of the Merrion case when Atkinson Trading Company hit his
court in 1998.249 Twenty years after struggling with the concept of tribal
sovereignty as a lawyer opposing Bob Nordhaus in Merrion, Black
confronted the issue of tribal taxing power as a judge when the nonIndian owner of a motel refused to pay a hotel occupancy tax imposed
on his guests by.the Navajo Nation. Because the transactions occurred on
non-Indian owned fee land within the reservation, Black started his
analysis with Montana, yet incorporated Merrion into his decision to
grant summary judgment for the tribe. The decision was affirmed by the
Tenth Circuit in an opinion written by Judge McKay, but the case was
overruled by the Supreme Court.m
Sitting today on the leather couch in his office on the sixth floor
of the U.S. Courthouse in front of a bank of windows that face east to the
Sandia Mountains, Black says of Merrion, "I lost both sides of the case.
The Supreme Court converted me in Merrion and then converted me
back in Atkinson."
Judge McKay, the Tenth Circuit judge who had listened to Bob
Nordhaus argue Merrion twice in 1979, heard the appeal of District Judge
Black's affirmation of Merrion in 2000. In even stronger words than the
lower court's, Judge McKay agreed with Judge Black's analysis in the
opinion he wrote for the Tenth Circuit majority:
In its review of Merrion in this case, the district court
acknowledged that Merrion involved tribal, and not fee, lands on the
reservation. The district court concluded, however, that Merrion's
discussion was not necessarily limited to cases involving tribal lands
because the Supreme Court characterized the tribe's authority to tax nonIndians doing business on the reservation as "an essential attribute of
248. Susie T. Parker, Independent Energy ProducersPush Measure Against Double Taxation,
THE OiL DAILY, July 15, 1991, at 3.
249. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Gorman, No. 97-1261 BB/LFG (D.N.M. Aug. 21, 1998).
250. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2000) (holding that a tribe lacked the
power to impose a tax on non-member guests of a hotel on non-member fee land within the
borders of a reservation and that neither exception applies to the general rule in Montana
that inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers).
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sovereignty" and not merely an extension of a tribe's power to exclude
persons from its tribal lands. 1
But the Supreme Court disagreed, and Justice Rehnquist said in
a footnote to the unanimous decision in Atkinson, "Although language in
Merrion referred to taxation as 'necessary to tribal self-government and
territorial management,' it did not address assertions of tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indian fee land. Just as with Montana's first
exception, incorporating Merrion's reasoning here would be tantamount
2
to rejecting Montana's general rule."
From his large square office overlooking Salt Lake City, Judge
McKay says, "I think Atkinson in the Supreme Court was a major retreat
from the Court's own opinions. It had not come home to me how
seriously the trend away from Merrion was until the Atkinson decision.
While I was not surprised that it was decided against the Tribe, I was
surprised at the unanimous court in Atkinson. It was nine to zero. We
weren't wrong."
Asked to put Merrion in context today, Judge McKay now sees
the Supreme Court's decision in Atkinson as part of a long process. "The
Supreme Court has begun to erode its earlier decisions and emasculate
the idea of tribal sovereignty. The Court built a body of law of tribal sovereignty under the aegis of Congress. The current Court is in the process,
and has been for nearly two decades, of eroding those protections of the
power of tribes to govern their own affairs within their territorial
boundaries."
One hundred and fifty years after Justice John Marshall created
the paradigm of tribal sovereignty in Worcester, another Justice Marshall
affirmed it in Merrion. There the 1982 decision sits at the pinnacle of the
idea of Indian sovereignty. Through his work with the Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, attorney Robert Nordhaus left a legacy of tribal sovereignty that
he acknowledges is the Jicarilla's hard-won battle. "The tribe saw it as
their victory. I certainly didn't see it as mine."
A litigator able to guide the complex case from beginning to end,
able to move from a catch-as-you-can emergency hearing
attorney
an
district judge in Albuquerque to the vault-like courtroom
a
hostile
before
of the United States Supreme Court, from two appellate courts so
conflicted that they each had to hear the same case twice, from a decision
that teetered frequently on the edge of disaster, Robert Nordhaus
emerges from Merrion as a lawyer's lawyer. Seated at a table in his
library at the age of 93, surrounded by the stuff of his long career in
Indian law and with the Jicarilla Tribe-the Pendleton blankets, the
Council on Energy Resource Tribes' appreciation plaques, an affectionate
251.
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note from one of his firm's younger partners telling him how many
millions of dollars Merrion won for his beleaguered tribal clientsNordhaus is remarkably humble.
"It's just what any good lawyer would have tried to do," he says.
"I'm not invincible you know. According to the Albuquerque Journal,
Moses and I once lost the fastest verdict since statehood. We put on the
best defense we could and the jury convicted our client in less then five
minutes."
Then he looks up, smiles, and adds, "I think Merrion was a
fundamental move in Indian law and a tremendous victory for the Tribe.
The most important triumph was that the small Apache Tribe had faced
the giants of the oil and gas industry and won."

